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ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES WOMEN
FACE IN RETIREMENT: IMPROVING
SOCIAL SECURITY, PENSIONS, AND SSI
JOAN ENTMACHER* AND AMY MATSUI**
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is a truth universally acknowledged (or it should be) that
women are more economically vulnerable than men in retirement.
On average, women’s lifetime earnings are lower than men’s, and
divorce, single parenthood, and widowhood have a particularly
detrimental impact on women’s economic security.1 Thus, women
reach retirement with lower Social Security benefits, smaller
pensions and retirement savings, and fewer assets than men.
However, women actually need more assets to achieve retirement
security because they generally live longer than men, face higher
health care costs, and spend more years alone. In 2011, almost 11
percent of women 65 and older lived in poverty compared to about
six percent of men 65 and older, and about one in five older single
women and older Black and Hispanic women were poor.2 For these
reasons, addressing America’s retirement crisis requires policy
solutions that specifically address the challenges women face in
retirement, especially low-income women, women of color, and
single older women.
The classic metaphor for sources of retirement income is a
three-legged stool, whose legs represent income from Social
Security, pensions, and other savings and assets. A more apt

* Joan Entmacher is Vice President for Family Economic Security at the
National Women’s Law Center (NWLC). Ms. Entmacher directs NWLC’s
program to improve policies affecting the economic security of low-income
women and their families. Ms. Entmacher is a graduate of Wellesley College
and Yale Law School.
** Amy K. Matsui is Senior Counsel and Director of Women and the Courts at
NWLC. She is a graduate of the University of California at Berkeley, and
Stanford Law School.
1. See Nat’l Econ. Council Interagency Working Grp. on Soc. Sec., Women
SEC.
ADMIN.,
and
Retirement
Security,
SOC.
http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/women.html (last modified Nov. 28, 2012)
(explaining that women have lower lifetime earnings than men and thus have
greater need for Social Security).
2. Insecure & Unequal: Poverty and Income Among Women and Families,
2000-2011,
NWLC
5
(2012),
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/nwlc_2012_poverty report.pdf.
749
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metaphor today, however, especially for low- and moderate-income
women, is a pyramid. For all but the highest-income families,
Social Security provides the largest source of retirement income.3
Pensions and retirement savings, other savings and assets, and
income from work, may add a little on top of that base.
Unfortunately, for many women, their pyramid of retirement
income is hardly an imposing one.
Social Security benefits, which are lifelong, inflation-adjusted,
and virtually universal, are the foundation for women’s retirement
security. Social Security provides more than 60 percent of family
income on average for female beneficiaries 65 and older.4 For
nearly three in ten women 65 and older, Social Security is
virtually their only source of income (90 percent or more).5 But
Social Security benefits are already modest, especially for women,
and already declining, as the retirement age increases and rising
Medicare premiums consume a larger share of monthly Social
Security benefits.6
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is a means-tested
program intended to provide a basic income floor for society’s most
economically vulnerable citizens—the elderly poor and poor adults
and children with disabilities.7 It is a particularly critical program
for women, who make up over two-thirds of all beneficiaries 65
and older.8 Yet SSI benefits are below the poverty level, and asset
tests and income limits that have barely changed in the 40 years
since SSI was enacted leave beneficiaries unable to use modest
Social Security benefits or other retirement income to supplement
their SSI benefits.9
Pensions and retirement savings, including employersponsored retirement plans and tax-favored Individual Retirement
Accounts (IRAs), are critical supplements to Social Security
retirement income. Unfortunately, even though an increasing
percentage of women participate in the workforce and have access
3. Income of the Population 55 and Older: 2010, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. 37
(2012),
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/income_pop55/2010/sect02.pdf
[hereinafter Income of the Population 55 and Older: 2010].
4. Women
and
Social
Security,
NWLC
(Nov.
28,
2012),
http://www.nwlc.org/ resource/women-and-social-security.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Joan Entmacher & Katherine Gallagher Robbins, Chained CPI
Imposes Painful Social Security Benefit Cuts and a Benefit Bump-Up Provides
Only Limited Relief, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR. 4 (Dec. 2012),
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/chained cpibirthdaybumpup.pdf.
8. Id.
9. Joan Entmacher, After 40 Years, Time to Modernize SSI, NAT’L
WOMEN’S LAW CTR. BLOG (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.nwlc.org/our-blog/after40-years-time-modernize-ssi.
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to employer-sponsored retirement plans, women earn less, are
more likely to work part time, spend more time out of the
workforce, and have shorter job tenure than men. As a result,
women accrue significantly fewer retirement savings than men
through the employer-sponsored retirement savings system. And,
as traditional defined benefit plans are supplanted by defined
contribution plans and IRAs, women’s access to lifetime income in
retirement, both as workers and as spouses, has diminished over
time.
This Article focuses on proposals to improve Social Security,
SSI, and employer-sponsored pensions and retirement savings to
increase women’s retirement security. The Article does not address
other sources of retirement income (such as other savings and
assets or income from work); housing, energy, and nutrition
assistance; nor costs that particularly impact women’s retirement
security (such as health care, long-term care, or the unexpected
costs of caring for grandchildren or other dependents).
II. SOCIAL SECURITY
It is hard to overstate the importance of Social Security to
women’s retirement security. Without income from Social Security,
nearly half of all women 65 and older would be poor.10 Yet women’s
benefits are modest, averaging $12,700 per year for women 65 and
older, compared to $16,700 for men.11
Enhancing Social Security benefits is a key strategy for
increasing women’s retirement security. Social Security has many
of the features of an ideal pension plan in that it: (1) is virtually
universal, covering low-paid, part-time, and temporary workers,
and the self-employed; (2) is fully portable between jobs; (3) uses a
progressive benefit formula that gives lower earners a larger
percentage of their pre-retirement earnings; (4) provides secure,
predictable, retirement benefits that last for life; (5) is not subject
to the ups and downs of the stock market or the risk of depletion
prior to reaching retirement; (6) adjusts annually for inflation; (7)
provides automatic benefits to eligible spouses, surviving spouses,
and divorced spouses, and dependent children; (8) includes
disability and life insurance benefits as well as retirement
benefits; (9) imposes few responsibilities on employers; and (10) is
highly efficient. It spends less than one percent of the funds
collected each year on administrative costs.12
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Virginia P. Reno et al., Social Security Brief No. 39, Social Security
Finances: Findings of the 2012 Trustees Report, NAT’L ACAD. OF SOC. INS. 1
(2012),
http://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/SS_Finances_Findings_of_the_
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Since the nation’s Social Security system was first created as
a worker retirement program in 1935, it has been improved for
women in several ways.13 In 1939, Social Security became a family
insurance plan, with protection for spouses and children against
the loss of income when a worker retires or dies.14 In 1950,
coverage was expanded to domestic workers, who were
overwhelmingly women of color, and farm workers, and benefits
were significantly increased.15 Disability benefits were added in
1956.16 In 1965, divorced spouses become eligible for benefits if
married for 20 years.17 In 1972, automatic cost-of-living
adjustments (COLAs) were enacted, protecting benefits from being
eroded by inflation over women’s longer lifespans.18 That same
year, the widow’s benefit was increased to 100 percent of the
worker’s benefit, if both spouses claimed at their full retirement
age.19 In 1977, Congress reduced the duration of marriage
requirement for divorced spouses to ten years.20 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court ruled that benefits for widows and widowers had
to be awarded on a gender-neutral basis.21
But in more recent years, Social Security benefits have been
declining, the result of both policy choices and rising health care
costs. In 1983, legislation enacted to keep the Social Security
system solvent reduced benefits for future retirees by 19 percent.22
2012_Trustees_Report.pdf.
13. See Historical Background and Development, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/history/ (last modified Jan. 1, 2013) (discussing the history
of Social Security).
14. Pre-Social Security Period: Traditional Sources of Economic Security,
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (last modified
Jan. 10, 2013).
15. See Fifty Years of Social Security, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/history/ 50mm2.html (last modified Dec. 11, 2012)
(explaining that social security benefits were extended to domestic workers in
1950).
SEC.
ADMIN.,
16. Chronology:
1950s,
SOC.
http://www.ssa.gov/history/1950.html (last modified Nov. 8, 2012).
SEC.
ADMIN.,
17. Chronology:
1960s,
SOC.
http://www.ssa.gov/history/1960.html (last modified Nov. 8, 2012).
SEC.
ADMIN.,
18. Chronology:
1970s,
SOC.
http://www.ssa.gov/history/1970.html (last modified Nov. 8, 2012).
19. David A. Weaver, The Widow(er)’s Limit Provision of Social Security,
64-1 SOC. SEC. BULLETIN 1 (2001/2002).
20. Christopher R. Tamborini & Kevin Whitman, Women, Marriage, and
Social Security Benefits Revisited, 67-4 SOC. SEC. BULLETIN 3 (2007),
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v67n4/67n4p1.pdf.
21. See generally Califano v. Goldfarb, 433 U.S. 199 (1977) (prohibiting
differential treatment of widows and widowers).
22. Virginia P. Reno et al., Social Security Brief No. 37, Social Security
Beneficiaries Face 19% Cut; New Revenue Can Restore Balance, NAT’L ACAD.
OF
SOC.
INS.
1
(June
2011),
http://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/SS_Brief_037.pdf.
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Most of the reduction is due to a phased-in increase in the age at
which retirees can receive full benefits from age 65 to age 67 for
workers born after 1959.23 The percentage cut in benefits from the
increasing retirement age is the same for workers at all benefit
levels.24 But the cuts will reduce total income the most for lowerincome beneficiaries, such as women, who depend most heavily on
Social Security. In addition, rising Medicare premiums, which are
deducted from Social Security benefits, will further reduce the
income available to meet other needs.
With all Americans facing greater economic risks in today’s
economy—and older women still at greater risk of poverty and
economic insecurity than older men—policymakers should be
considering improvements, not cuts, to Social Security benefits.
This Article outlines several options for improving Social
Security benefits to increase retirement security for economically
vulnerable older women, including improving the minimum
benefit, crediting caregiving, reforming the benefit for surviving
spouses, and using the more accurate Consumer Price Index for
the Elderly to calculate the annual COLA. Other reforms that
should be considered as part of a comprehensive Social Security
reform package include improvements to disability benefits,
restoring student benefits, eliminating discrimination against
same-sex married couples, partners, and their children, and an
across-the-board increase in benefits to increase retirement
security for an increasingly insecure middle class. These reforms
cost money and Social Security faces a long-term financing
shortfall. However, it is feasible to raise the revenue to close the
shortfall and pay for reforms, as a number of recent reform
packages have demonstrated—if the political will is there.25 By
23. Id. at 2.
24. Id. at 1-2.
25. See, e.g., Breaking the Social Security Glass Ceiling: A Proposal to
Modernize Women’s Benefits, NAT’L COMM. TO PRESERVE SOC. SEC. &
MEDICARE, NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN FOUND. & INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y
RESEARCH
18
(2012),
http://www.ncpssm
foundation.org/Portals/0/embargo_breaking_ss_glass_ceiling.pdf [hereinafter
Breaking the Social Security Glass Ceiling] (proposing ways to strengthen the
Social Security program); Plan for a New Future: The Impact of Social Security
Reform on People of Color, COMM’N TO MODERNIZE SOC. SEC. 31-38 (2011),
http://www.insightcced.org/up
loads/CRWG/New_Future_Social_Security_Commission_Report_Final.pdf
[hereinafter Plan for a New Future] (discussing possible reforms for Social
Security); Virginia P. Reno & Joni Lavery, Fixing Social Security: Adequate
Benefits, Adequate Financing, NAT’L ACAD. OF SOC. INS. 13 (2009),
http://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/
Fixing_Social_Security.pdf
(providing revenue raising options for Social Security); see generally
Strengthening Social Security and SSI to Improve Women’s Retirement
Security: Hearing Before the S. Special Committee on Aging, 112th Cong.
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large margins, Americans support protecting and improving Social
Security, and are willing to pay higher taxes to do that.26 In
addition, reforms to Social Security benefits should be considered
in conjunction with reforms to SSI, discussed in the next section of
this paper, to ensure that the many poor people who are eligible
for both programs benefit from the increase in Social Security
benefits and that their eligibility for Medicaid is protected.
A. Improve the Special Minimum Benefit for Low Lifetime
Earners
The regular Social Security benefit formula is progressive.27 It
provides workers with low lifetime earnings a benefit that
represents a higher percentage of their pre-retirement income
than higher-income workers.28 However, benefits are proportional
to average lifetime earnings, and for workers with very low
lifetime earnings, benefits calculated under the regular formula
will still be very low. More than twice as many women as men
receive benefits as retired workers that provide less than a
poverty-level income: over 40 percent of female workers compared
to 18 percent of male workers receive below-poverty benefits.29
Social Security has an alternative benefit formula, the Special
Minimum Benefit (SMB), which is intended to “provide long-term
(2012) (testimony of Joan Entmacher, Vice President for Fam. Econ. Sec.,
NWLC),
available
at
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/entmacher_testimony_senate_agin
g_7-25-2012.pdf (discussing need for improvements and reforms for Social
Security).
26. Jasmine V. Tucker et al., Strengthening Social Security: What Do
ACAD.
OF
SOC.
INS.
8
(2013),
Americans
Want?,
NAT’L
http://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/
research/What_Do_Americans_Want.pdf.
27. Andrew G. Biggs et al., A Progressivity Index for Social Security,
OFFICE OF RET. & DISABILITY POL’Y, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., (2009),
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/issue papers/ip2009-01.html.
28. Id.
29. Compare Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin,
2012: Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance, Benefits in Current
Payment Status, OFFICE OF RET. & DISABILITY POL’Y, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.
tbl.5.B9
(Feb.
2013),
http://www.ssa.
gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2012/5b.html
[hereinafter
Old-Age,
Survivors, and Disability Insurance] (providing information regarding retired
worker benefits for individuals age 62 and older), with Current Population
Survey, 2012 Annual Social and Economic Supplement, Table POV35: Poverty
Thresholds by Size of Family and Number of Related Children, CENSUS
BUREAU
(Feb.
14,
2013),
http://www.census.gov/hhes/
www/cpstables/032012/pov/toc.htm [hereinafter Current Population Survey]
(explaining the Census’ poverty threshold for one adult at age 65 and older).
Using the Census Bureau’s thresholds, the poverty line for one elderly
individual in 2011 was about $899 per month. Id.
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workers with an income that would free them from dependency on
welfare.”30 Workers receive the higher of a benefit calculated
under the SMB or any other benefit to which they are entitled
under the regular formula as a worker or as a spouse, surviving
spouse, or divorced spouse of a higher earner.31
However, the current SMB does little to help workers with
low benefits. Only about 70,000 people—a little over one-tenth of
one percent of all beneficiaries—receive benefits under the SMB.32
The number has been declining because the SMB is price-indexed,
while the regular formula is wage-indexed; soon, the SMB will
disappear entirely. Another reason the SMB is ineffective is that it
requires significant earnings for a year of credit: it took $12,280 in
2012 to qualify for one year of credit toward the SMB, compared to
only $4,530 to qualify for a year (four quarters) of credit toward
Social Security.33 For a woman earning the federal minimum wage
of $7.25 per hour, earning one year of credit toward the SMB
requires steady employment of about 34 hours per week, 50 weeks
per year. But the low-wage labor market is characterized by
unstable, part-time and seasonal jobs, and the work histories of
low earners are interrupted by caregiving—a particularly
important factor for women—unemployment, or poor health.34
And, if a worker falls even $1 short of the threshold, she gets no
credit toward the SMB. Finally, even workers who have the 30
years of qualified earnings needed to receive the maximum SMB
receive a benefit that leaves them about $1,800 below the federal
poverty guideline.35
30. See Kelly A. Olsen & Don Hoffmeyer, Social Security’s Special
Minimum Benefit, 64-2 SOC. SEC. BULLETIN 1, 4 (2001-2002),
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/ v64n2/v64n2p1.pdf (discussing a committee
bill to help prevent consistent long-term workers from needing to rely on
welfare).
31. Id. at 2.
32. Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance, supra note 29, at
tbl.5.A1, tbl.5.A8 (providing the number and average monthly benefit by type
of benefit and sex, and the number, average primary insurance amount, and
average monthly benefit for persons with benefits based on special minimum
primary insurance amount by type of benefit and sex).
33. Breaking the Social Security Glass Ceiling, supra note 25, at 12.
34. Melissa Favreault, A New Minimum Benefit for Low Lifetime Earners,
URBAN
INST.
1
(Nov.
19,
2008),
http://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/Melissa_
Favreault_January_2009_Rockefeller.pdf.
35. Effective December 2012, for 2013, the maximum SMB is $804.00 per
month, or about $9,650 per year. Special Minimum Benefit Tables, SOC. SEC.
ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/oact/progdata/tableForm.html (last visited Feb.
14, 2013). The 2013 poverty guideline for a single individual is $11, 490. U.S.
Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Annual Update of HHS Poverty
REGISTER
(Jan.
24,
2013),
Guideline,
FED.
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/01/24/2013-01422/annual-
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A number of changes to the SMB would make it more
effective in providing a meaningful benefit. They include: (1)
increasing the maximum value of the benefit to at least 125
percent of the federal poverty level; (2) reducing the earnings
needed to earn credits toward the SMB to the same amount
required for regular Social Security credits; (3) allowing workers to
earn partial credit, as they can under the regular Social Security
formula; (4) indexing initial benefits to wage growth, the way
regular benefits are indexed; and (5) providing up to eight years of
credit toward the SMB for years in which a worker was caring for
a young child or dependent adult. Similar recommendations for
improving the SMB have been part of several recent reform
proposals.36
B. Credit Caregiving in the Regular Benefit Formula
Many workers, especially women, take time out of the paid
labor force to care for children, elderly parents, or other family
members, sacrificing both current income and retirement security.
Many other countries provide pension credits for such socially and
economically vital caregiving work.37 However, Social Security
does not provide credit for lost or reduced earnings due to
caregiving, so those who took time out of the labor force, worked
part-time, or accepted lower pay in exchange for the flexibility to
meet caregiving responsibilities can see significantly lower
benefits. The only way Social Security currently compensates
caregiving is indirectly, through spousal benefits. But many
women, who took time out of the labor force for caregiving,
including women who have never married or whose marriage
lasted less than ten years, do not qualify for spousal benefits, and
update-of-the-hhs-poverty-guidelines#t-1.
36. Compare Reno & Lavery, supra note 25, at 11 (promoting the increase
in Special Minimum Benefits); Plan for a New Future, supra note 25, at 38
(explaining that the Special Minimum Benefits need to be increased);
Breaking the Social Security Glass Ceiling, supra note 25, at 11-12 (suggesting
improvements for Special Minimum Benefits), with The Moment of Truth, THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM (2012),
http://www.momentoftruthproject.org/sites/
default/files/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf
(proposing
options
for
strengthening the SMB while also proposing substantial benefit cuts, as a way
to mitigate the impact of those cuts for some beneficiaries).
37. Elaine Fultz, Pension Crediting for Caregivers, Policies in Finland,
France, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan, INST.
WOMEN’S
POL’Y
RESEARCH
6
(2011),
FOR
http://www.iwpr.org/publications/pubs/pension-crediting-for-caregiverspolicies-in-finland-france-germany-sweden-the-united-kingdom-canada-andjapan. In 2009, 26 of 30 OECD member countries had pension crediting for
caregivers. Id. at 1. Only the United States, Turkey, Mexico and Australia
lacked these systems. Id. at 6.
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the number of women who do not qualify for spousal benefits is
growing.38
One way to provide credit for caregiving in the Social Security
benefit formula would impute earnings for caregiving years up to
50 percent of the average wage that year, if the actual wages that
year were less. Up to five years of credit would be available for
providing care for a young child, older disabled child, or other
dependent relative.39
C. Improve Benefits for Widowed Spouses
Older single women—widowed, divorced, and nevermarried—face a far greater risk of poverty than older married
women and men. In 2010, only 4.2 percent of married women 65
and older receiving Social Security benefits were poor, compared to
15.8 percent of single older women.40
Although poverty rates are higher for never-married and
divorced women than for widows (20.3 percent and 17.6 percent
compared to 14.1 percent, respectively),41 widows are—and are
projected to remain—the largest group of poor elderly women by
marital status.42 An improved Social Security benefit for widowed
spouses could reduce poverty and provide more equitable benefits
for the survivor of dual-earner, lower-income couples.
Social Security provides protection to workers and their
families in case of disability or early death and, at retirement,
offers benefits to spouses, surviving spouses, and divorced spouses
(if the marriage lasted ten years). The benefit for a spouse or
divorced spouse equals 50 percent of the worker’s benefit; the
benefit for a surviving spouse or divorced surviving spouse equals
100 percent of the worker’s benefit, if no early retirement
reductions apply. These spousal benefits, like all Social Security
benefits, are available on an equal basis to women and men, wives
and husbands, widows and widowers, but the vast majority of
individuals receiving spousal benefits are women.43
38. Howard Iams & Christopher Tamborini, The Implications of Marital
History Change on Women’s Eligibility for Social Security Wife and Widow
SEC.
BULLETIN
(2012),
Benefits,
1990-2009,
SOC.
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v72n2/v72n 2p23.html.
39. Reno & Lavery, supra note 25; Plan for a New Future, supra note 25;
Breaking the Social Security Glass Ceiling, supra note 25.
40. Income of the Population 55 and Older: 2010, supra note 3, at tbl.11.1.
41. Id.
42. Joan Entmacher, Strengthening Social Security Benefits for
Widow(er)s: The 75% Combined Worker Benefit Alternative, NAT’L WOMEN’S
LAW
CTR.
1
(Nov.
2008),
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/BenefitImprovementforWidowsFeb
09.pdf [hereinafter Strengthening Social Security Benefits for Widow(er)s].
43. Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance, supra note 29.

Do Not Delete

758

10/18/2013 4:29 PM

The John Marshall Law Review

[46:749

The spousal benefits are designed to provide basic income
security for a spouse, so a spouse or widowed spouse who is also
eligible for a benefit as a worker can receive the higher of the
worker benefit or spousal benefit, but not both. The following
examples illustrate how the current survivor benefit works,
assuming both spouses claim benefits at their full retirement age:
(1) George receives a monthly Social Security benefit of
$1,000 per month. His wife Martha does not have sufficient credits
to qualify for Social Security and receives a benefit as a spouse of
$500 per month, giving the household combined benefits of $1,500.
At widowhood, Martha receives a benefit of $1,000, 67 percent of
their combined benefits.
(2) John and Abigail have equal lifetime earnings and equal
monthly benefits of $750, for combined benefits of $1,500. At
widowhood, Abigail receives a $750 benefit, because her benefit as
a worker offsets her benefit as a widow dollar for dollar. The
benefit she receives when widowed is 50 percent of their combined
benefits.
These examples highlight several features of the current
surviving spouse benefit. First, household Social Security benefits
drop at widowhood by 33 percent to 50 percent. Although the cost
of maintaining a household declines when there is only one person
to support, based on the Census Bureau’s poverty thresholds a
one-person elderly household needs 79 percent of the income of a
two-person household to maintain the same standard of living.44
Second, the decline in Social Security benefits at widowhood is
largest for households in which the spouses’ earnings were more
equal. Third, the survivor of a dual-earner couple who contributed
more to Social Security over their working lives can end up with a
lower benefit than the survivor of a single-earner couple that
contributed less. Moreover, these examples assume that both
spouses waited to their full retirement age to claim benefits; if
either claims benefits earlier, the survivor benefit would be further
reduced.45
The drop in Social Security income at widowhood—the largest
component of most families’ income—is a significant factor in
widows’ poverty.46 And, it is often accompanied by a drop in
pension income, loss of earnings from a spouse who was still

44. See Poverty Thresholds by Size of Family and Number of Children for
2011,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/threshld/index.html (showing
79 percent for two-person adult household with elderly householder and 78
percent for two-person adult household with non-elderly householder).
45. Strengthening Social Security Benefits for Widow(er)s, supra note 42, at
6.
46. Id. at 24.
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employed, or depletion of assets due to medical and other expenses
associated with the death of a spouse.47 Ironically, the increase in
labor force participation by married women and the increased
share of household income contributed by wives means that more
widows—and widowers—in the future will experience a drop in
household Social Security benefits that approaches 50 percent.
One approach to making the surviving spouse benefit more
adequate and equitable would provide an alternative benefit equal
to 75 percent of the sum of the spouses’ combined worker benefits.
(Individuals would continue to receive the current law benefit, if it
were higher.) In addition, the value of the deceased spouse’s
benefit used in the calculation should not be reduced because of
that spouse’s decision to claim benefits before full retirement age.
The benefit increase could be targeted to low- and moderateincome couples by capping the alternative benefit.48 For example,
the benefit could be capped at the level of the benefit for a worker
with lifelong average earnings—$1,575 per month or $18,900 per
year for an individual retiring at age 66 in 2012.49
Other reforms would improve benefits for disabled
widow(er)s, a small but particularly vulnerable group,50 by
eliminating the age 50 requirement, the requirement that the
disability occur within seven years of the spouse’s death or last
eligibility for benefits as a caregiving parent, and actuarial
reduction for claiming benefits early. These limitations serve no
purpose for a group that is, by definition, unable to work and no
longer has the support of a spouse.
Reforms to the surviving spouse benefit could improve the
economic security of many women, but will not assist the growing
number of women, especially African-American women, who,
47. Nadia Karamcheva & Alicia Munnell, Why Are Widows So Poor?, CTR.
RET. RESEARCH AT BOSTON COLL. 1, 4 (2007), http://crr.bc.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2007/07/i b_7-9.pdf; Kathleen McGarry & Robert F. Schoeni,
Medicare Gaps and Widow Poverty, 66-1 SOC. SEC. BULLETIN 58, 59 (2005),
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v66n1/v66 n1p58.pdf.
48. See generally Entmacher, supra note 42 (providing more detailed
information about this proposal); see also generally Reno & Lavery, supra note
25; Plan for a New Future, supra note 25; Breaking the Social Security Glass
Ceiling, supra note 25 (providing a similar recommendation).
49. Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin, 2012,
SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.
Tbl.2A.26
(Feb.
2013),
U.S.
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/ supplement/2012/2a20-2a28.pdf.
50. See generally Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the
CENSUS
BUREAU
(2011),
United
States:
2010,
U.S.
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-239.pdf (explaining that people with
disabilities had higher rates of poverty in 2010 than those without disabilities,
and that for those working full time, men and women with disabilities had
much lower median earnings in 2010 than their counterparts without
disabilities).
FOR
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because of changing marital histories, will not qualify for a
widow’s benefit.51 Thus, improvement of the widow(er)’s benefit
should be part of a broader reform plan.
D. Improve the Cost-of-Living Adjustment to Reflect Elders’ True
Cost of Living
To prevent inflation from eroding the value of Social Security
benefits over time, Social Security provides an automatic annual
cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) based on the Consumer Price
Index (CPI). This protection is especially important to women, who
constitute 72 percent of beneficiaries age 90 and older.52 But the
current CPI underestimates the effect of inflation on the elderly
because it does not reflect the spending patterns of older
Americans, who spend twice as large a share of their budgets on
health care,53 where costs are rising much more rapidly than for
other goods and services.54
When the annual COLA became a part of Social Security 40
years ago, there was only one Consumer Price Index: the CPI-W,
which is based on the spending patterns of urban wage earners, a
group that does not include retirees. Recognizing the need to
update the COLA, in the Older Americans Act of 1987, Congress
directed the Bureau of Labor Statistics to develop an alternative
experimental Consumer Price Index for the Elderly, the CPI-E, to
take account of the spending patterns of elderly individuals.
The Congressional Budget Office found that compared to the
CPI-E, the CPI-W understated the effects of inflation on older
individuals by about 0.3 percentage points per year between 1983
51. Iams & Tamborini, supra note 38.
52. See Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance, supra note 29
(providing data for NWLC’s calculations based on Table 5.A10); see generally
Joan Entmacher & Katherine Gallagher Robbins, Cutting the Social Security
COLA by Changing the Way Inflation Is Calculated Would Especially Hurt
NWLC
(2011),
Women,
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/cuttingsocseccola.pdf
(providing
information about the importance of the COLA to women, different ways of
calculating it, and their implications).
53. See Brian W. Cashell, A Separate Consumer Price Index for the
Elderly?, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV. 4 (Jan. 20, 2010),
http://aging.senate.gov/crs/aging9 .pdf [hereinafter CRS, Separate Price Index]
(explaining that for people 65 and older, the share of spending devoted to
health care is twice that of consumers generally; for people 65 and older, it is
two and one-half times).
54. See Consumer Price Index - All Urban Consumers, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, http://data.bls.gov/pdq/querytool.jsp?survey=cu (last visited Jan.
29, 2013) [hereinafter CPI-U] (providing the calculator and data for NWLC’s
calculations). Between 2003 and 2012, the annual CPI-U for all items less
medical care (2.4 percent) has grown at a slower rate than for medical care
alone (3.8 percent). Id.
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and 2009, primarily because of the greater weight given to rapidly
rising health care costs.55 However, Congress has not adopted the
more accurate CPI-E for calculating Social Security and
Supplemental Security Income benefits.
Because the current Social Security COLA does not reflect the
rising cost of health care, health care costs consume a greater
share of the Social Security check over time, leaving seniors less
money to meet other needs. Replacing the current CPI with one
that more accurately reflects the impact of inflation on the elderly
would be particularly helpful to women, helping Social Security
benefits to keep pace with health care costs that are rising both
with inflation and advancing age, just as replacing the current CPI
with a lower, less accurate index—the chained-CPI—would be
particularly harmful.56 To make the COLA more accurate and
adequate, the CPI-W could be replaced with the CPI-E or other
inflation index developed to measure changes in the cost of living
for the elderly for calculating Social Security and Supplemental
Security Income benefits.57
III. SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME
In addition to enhancing Social Security benefits, a
comprehensive strategy for reducing poverty among elderly women
should include improvements to SSI. SSI is a means-tested
program intended to provide a basic income floor for society’s most
economically vulnerable people—the elderly poor and poor adults
and children with disabilities.58 It is a particularly critical
program for women, who make up over two-thirds of all
beneficiaries age 65 and older.59
The maximum federal SSI benefit is $710 per month for an
individual.60 Raising it to $937 per month would provide at least a
55. Noah Meyerson, Using a Different Measure of Inflation for Indexing
Federal Programs and the Tax Code, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE 7 (Feb.
24,
2010),
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/112xx/doc11256/cpi_brief.
pdf [hereinafter CBO, Different Measure of Inflation].
56. Entmacher & Gallagher Robbins, supra note 7.
57. See Breaking the Social Security Glass Ceiling, supra note 25. Senator
Mark Begich (D-AK) and Representative Ted Deutch (D-FL) introduced bills
in the 113th Congress to calculate the COLA using the Consumer Price Index
for the Elderly. Protecting and Preserving Social Security Act, S. 3651, 113th
Cong. (2013).
58. The Supplemental Security Income Program, 2011 Annual Report of the
SEC.
ADMIN.
(May
27,
2011),
SSI
Program,
SOC.
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/ssir/SSI11/ ProgramDescription.html.
59. SSI Annual Statistical Report, U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN. 22 tbl.5 (2011),
http://www .socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/ssi_asr/2011/sect02.pdf.
60. See Recommendations to Update the Supplemental Security Income
SENIOR
CITIZEN’S
LAW
CTR.
(Jan.
2013),
Program,
NAT’L
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poverty-level income.61 And updating out-of-date program rules
would allow beneficiaries to supplement those payments with
modest Social Security benefits, pensions, or savings.
A. Update SSI’s Earnings Disregard
A majority of SSI recipients also qualify for Social Security
benefits, and some may have modest income from a pension or
annuity. SSI rules count Social Security benefits, pensions, and
annuity income as “unearned” income.62 With the exception of a
$20 per month general income disregard, every additional $1 in
Social Security or pension benefits means $1 less in SSI benefits,
the equivalent of a 100 percent tax.63 The $20 per month unearned
income disregard has not changed since the SSI program was
enacted in 1972.64
Updating the disregard to reflect inflation since 1972 would
increase it to $110 per month.65 Indexing the higher disregard to
increases in the cost of living would protect it from similar erosion
in the future.66
B. Modernize SSI’s Asset Limit
The current asset limit for SSI recipients is just $2,000 for an
individual and $3,000 for a couple, amounts that Congress has not
updated in nearly 30 years. Savings held in an IRA or other
http://www.nsclc.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/RecommendationsSSI0113.pdf (stating that the current monthly benefit is $710).
61. See Supplemental Security Income Improvements Are Long Overdue,
NAT’L SENIOR CITIZENS’ LAW CTR. 1 (June 2012), http://www.nsclc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/07/SSI-Modernization-Revised12.pdf
[hereinafter
Supplemental Security Income Improvements Are Long Overdue] (explaining
that in the majority of states, individuals who receive SSI benefits cannot have
a monthly income greater than $718.00 and proposing some possible reforms).
See generally Recommendations to Update the Supplemental Security Income
SENIOR
CITIZEN’S
LAW
CTR.
(Jan.
2013),
Program,
NAT’L
http://www.nsclc.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/RecommendationsSSI0113.pdf [hereinafter Recommendations to Update the Supplemental Security
Income Program] (providing a discussion of needed SSI reforms).
62. A Guide to Supplemental Security Income (SSI) for Groups and
SEC.
ADMIN.
11
(2013),
Organizations,
SOC.
http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/11015.pdf.
63. Robert Greenstein & Eileen Sweeney, Proposed Improvements in Social
Security’s Minimum Benefit and Widow’s Benefit Could Harm Some of
Nation’s Poorest People: Proposals Would Have Unintended Side-Effect Unless
Accompanied by a Change in the SSI Program, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES 2 (June 27, 2005), http://www.cbpp.org/files/6-27-05socsec.pdf.
64. Supplemental Security Income Improvements Are Long Overdue, supra
note 61.
65. Recommendations to Update the Supplemental Security Income
Program, supra note 61, at 2.
66. Id.
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qualified retirement plan count toward these asset limits, making
it virtually impossible for an SSI recipient to save for retirement.67
Increasing the asset limit to at least $10,000 for an
individual, and $15,000 for a couple, would allow individuals to
accumulate some savings for emergencies.68 Enacting a separate
exclusion for qualified retirement savings of at least $10,000 for an
individual, and $15,000 for a couple, would enable low-income
workers to accumulate some savings for retirement. Both amounts
should be indexed to inflation.
IV. PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT SAVINGS
The national Elder Index shows that single individuals need
between $19,104 to $28,860, and couples need between $29,448
and $39,204, annually to meet expenses as older adults.69
Although Social Security forms the basis of women’s retirement
security, the average Social Security benefit ($12,700 for women
65 and older) is insufficient to provide for a secure and dignified
retirement. Women need income from savings and assets to
supplement the guaranteed lifelong benefits that form the base of
their retirement income pyramid. For most, employer-sponsored
pension and retirement savings plans are the most likely source of
additional retirement income.70
Traditional, defined benefit (DB) pensions have been shown to
play a vital role in reducing the risk of poverty and economic
hardship among older Americans who receive them, particularly
for the most vulnerable populations.71 But defined contribution

67. See Asset Limit Reform in the Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
CFED,
Program:
Remove
the
Penalty
for
Saving,
http://www.realeconomicimpact.org/Uploaded
Docs/Documents/SSI_Asset_Limits_One_Pager_HR_4937.pdf (last visited Apr.
4, 2013) (mentioning that the SSI program counts that resources that are
accessible to a person).
68. Id. at 3.
69. The National Economic Security Standard Index, GERONTOLOGY INST.,
UNIV.
OF
MASS.
BOSTON
6
(2012),
http://scholarworks.umb.edu/gerontologyinstitute_pubs/75.
70. See Chris E. Anguelov et al., Shifting Income Sources of the Aged,
OFFICE OF RET. & DISABILITY POL’Y, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (2012),
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v72n3/v72n3p59.html
(identifying
the
“three pillars” of retirement income as social security, personal savings, and
employer-provided pensions).
71. See generally Frank Porell & Diane Oakley, The Pension Factor 2012:
The Role of Defined Benefit Pensions in Reducing Elder Economic Hardships,
INST.
ON
RET.
SEC.
(July
2012),
NAT’L
http://www.nirsonline.org/storage/nirs/documents/Pension%20
Factor%202012/pensionfactor2012_final.pdf (discussing the significance of
defined benefit pensions for older recipients facing economic hardship).
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(DC) plans have increasingly supplanted DB pensions.72 Women
have modest savings; in 2004, the median DC plan and/or IRA
account balances for women ages 55 to 64 were $34,000.73 But
women’s retirement savings lag far behind those of men; the
median DC plan/IRA balance for men of the same age was $70,000
in 2004.74 Although neither men’s nor women’s median account
balances are sufficient to provide a secure retirement, women are
more at risk: a recent analysis by the Employee Benefit Research
Institute found that for people on the verge of retirement (Early
Boomers), the shortfall in retirement savings for single women is
about triple that of married individuals and nearly double that of
single males.75 As a result, on average, income from pensions and
annuities makes up a smaller percentage of women’s family
income than men’s family income, and the percentages are even
smaller for women of color.76 Yet, because women live, on average,
longer than men, they need more savings than men to get them
through retirement. At 65, the average life expectancy for women
is 19.7 years, compared to 17.0 for men.77 But this does not fully

72. See Private Pension Plan Bulletin Historical Tables and Graphs, EMP.
BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR 1 (Nov. 2012),
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/historicaltables.pdf (showing number of DB plans
declining from 103,346 in 1975 to 46,543 in 2010, and number of DC plans
increasing from 207,784 in 1975 to 654,469 in 2010).
73. Leslie E. Papke et al., Retirement Security for Women: Progress to Date
and Policies for Tomorrow, THE RET. SEC. PROJECT 4 tbl.1 (Feb. 2008),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Retiremen
t_security/RSP-PB_Women_FINAL_4.2.2008.pdf.
74. Id.
75. See Jack VanDerhei, Retirement Income Adequacy for Boomers and
Gen Xers: Evidence from the 2012 EBRI Retirement Security Project Model,
EBRI.ORG 3 tbl.5 (May 2012), http://ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_05_May12.RSPM-ER.Cvg1.pdf (finding that for people on the verge of retirement
(Early Boomers), the shortfall in savings is approximately $22,000 per person
for married individuals, $34,000 for single males, and $65,000 for single
females).
76. Percentage Distribution of Persons in Recipient Families, by Sex, Type
of Pension, and Age, 2010, OFFICE OF RET. & DISABILITY POL’Y, U.S. SOC. SEC.
ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/income_pop55/2010/sect06.html#tabl
e6.b1 (last visited Mar. 1, 2013); Percentage Distribution by Source of Family
Income, Race, Hispanic Origin and Sex, 2010, OFFICE OF RET. & DISABILITY
POL’Y,
U.S.
SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/income_pop55/2010/sect08.html#tabl
e8.b5 (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
77. Elizabeth Arias, United States Life Tables, 2006, NAT’L VITAL
STATISTICS
REPORTS
tbl.A
(June
2010),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr58/nvsr58_21.pdf [hereinafter U.S.
LIFE TABLES, 2006]. The Social Security Administration Office of the Chief
Actuary uses life expectancy tables in its estimates. See generally Felicitie C.
Bell et al., Unisex Life Expectancies at Birth and Age 65, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
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capture the difference in the odds that men and women who reach
age 65 will live to 80, 90, or 95. For individuals who reach 65,
women are 1.6 times as likely as men to live to 90 and twice as
likely as men to live to age 95.78
This gender gap in retirement savings is largely attributable
to women’s experience in the labor force. As discussed above,
women spend fewer years in the workforce, are more likely to work
part-time79 and earn less than their male counterparts.80 These
trends have persisted over time. Thus, despite greater labor force
participation, future female retirees are also expected to fall short
of their retirement savings needs—indeed, “Generation X-ers” are
projected to be less prepared for retirement than late Baby
Boomers.81
Some of these work patterns are due to family
responsibilities: women tend to bear greater responsibility for
caregiving, whether parenting,82 caring for sick, elderly, or
disabled family members,83 or sometimes both.84 Among working
OFFICE
OF
THE
CHIEF
ACTUARY
(June
2008),
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/ran2/an2008-2.pdf (establishing that the
Office of the Chief Actuary uses life expectancy tables).
78. NWLC calculations using U.S. LIFE TABLES, 2006, supra note 77.
79. See Hilda L. Solis & Keith Hall, Women in the Labor Force: A
Databook, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR & U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 69-72,
tbl.20 (Dec. 2011), http://bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2011.pdf [hereinafter Women
in the Labor Force: A Databook] (stating that nearly 27 percent of all employed
women are in part-time jobs, compared to about 13 percent of men).
80. See National Women’s Law Center (NWLC) Calculations Based on
Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement, Table
PINC-05: Work Experience in 2011 – People 15 Years Old and over by Total
Money Earnings in 2011, Age, Race, Hispanic Origin, Sex, and Disability
Status, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS & U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2012),
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/ 032012/perinc/toc.htm (indicating
that the typical full-time, year-round female worker is paid 77 percent of what
her male counterpart is paid).
81. See VanDerhei, supra note 75, at 7 fig.5 (including retirement income
from Social Security, DC account balances, IRA balances, DB annuities and/or
lump-sum distributions in the figures). The study found that for Generation Xers, the present value of the projected shortfall in savings will be
approximately $25,000 (per person) for married individuals, $42,000 for single
males, and $76,000 for single females; for late Boomers, the shortfalls would
be $21,000 (per person) for married individuals, $33,000 for single males, and
$67,000 for single females. Id.
82. See Economic News Release, Number of Jobs Held, Labor Market
Activity, and Earnings Growth Among the Youngest Baby Boomers: Results
from a Longitudinal Survey, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR (July 25, 2012), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/nlsoy.nr0.htm
[hereinafter Number of Jobs Held, Labor Market Activity, and Earnings
Growth Among the Youngest Baby Boomers] (stating that women of
childbearing age (18 to 46) spend 25 percent of their time out of the labor
force, compared to 10 percent for men in that same age range).
83. See Caregiving in the U.S.: Executive Summary, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR
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caregivers, two-thirds report having to take time off, one in five
have taken a leave of absence, and nearly one in ten have stopped
working entirely for caregiving-related reasons.85
Women’s marital and family status can also affect their
ability to save for retirement. Following a divorce, women are
more likely to experience a drop in their standard of living that
may, in turn, make it difficult for them to save for retirement.86
Women also may lose marital pension benefits and retirement
savings in the course of the division of property pursuant to the
divorce.87 In addition, single mothers, whether divorced or never
married, have, on average, less income than either single fathers
or married couples, making it even more difficult to put aside
current income to save for future retirement.88
All of these factors limit women’s ability to save for
retirement. This Part highlights some options for improving
women’s ability to accumulate pension benefits and retirement
savings through the employer-based retirement system, including
helping low- and moderate-income workers save for retirement,
improving access to lifetime income options, and bolstering
spousal protections in pension plans and other retirement savings
accounts. This discussion focuses on pensions and retirement
savings plans covered under ERISA, and to a lesser extent, IRAs.
It does not address state or federal employee pension plans,
including military, Foreign Service, or Railroad Retirement
CAREGIVING
&
AARP
4
(2009),
http://www.caregiving.org/pdf/research/CaregivingUSAllAgesExecSum.pdf
[hereinafter Caregiving in the U.S.: Executive Summary] (stating that twothirds of caregivers for sick, elderly or disabled family members are women).
84. See, e.g., Kim Parker & Eileen Patten, The Sandwich Generation:
Rising Financial Burdens for Middle-Aged Americans, PEW RESEARCH CTR.
(Jan. 13, 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/01/30/the-sandwichgeneration/ (stating that one in seven middle-aged adults is providing
financial support to both an aging parent and a child).
85. Caregiving in the U.S.: Executive Summary, supra note 83, at 17.
86. GAO-08-105, Retirement Security: Women Face Challenges in Ensuring
Financial Security in Retirement, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 22
(2007), http://www.gao.gov/assets/270/267910.pdf [hereinafter Women Face
Challenges in Ensuring Financial Security in Retirement].
87. See ERISA Advisory Council, Report: Disparities for Women and
Minorities
in
Retirement
Savings,
DEPT.
OF
LABOR
(2010),
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/2010ACreport3.html
(stating
that
numerous issues that arise during the division of retirement assets during
divorce put divorced women at risk of losing their share of marital retirement
benefits).
88. See Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic
Supplement, 2011 Family Income Table of Contents, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032012/faminc/finc03_000.htm
(last modified Sept. 12, 2012) (referring to median income levels for these
family structures).
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pensions.89
A. Help Low-Earning Women Workers Save for Retirement
Women constitute the majority of low- and moderate-income
workers. Nearly two-thirds of minimum wage workers are
women,90 and the median annual earnings of full-time, year-round
working women are $37,118, compared to $48,202 for men.91 In
addition, women are twice as likely to work part-time than men.92
Low- and moderate-income workers are less able to forego
income to save for retirement than higher-income workers. But
low- and moderate-income workers also face particular barriers to
saving for retirement through DC plans, which are the dominant
model in the employer-sponsored retirement system. First, women
participate heavily in small businesses,93 which are less likely to
offer retirement plans to their employees—almost 72 percent of
workers in small companies (those with fewer than 100 employees)
had no retirement plan at work in 2006.94 For those low- and
moderate-income workers whose employers do offer retirement
plans, there may be limits on their ability to participate. For
example, under current law, employers can generally exclude parttime employees (those working under approximately 20 hours per
week) from coverage under a DC plan.95 Further, although
89. Note that some of the issues that adversely affect women in the private
pension system exist in these plans, to a certain extent, as well.
90. See Fair Pay for Women Requires Increasing the Minimum Wage and
Tipped
Minimum
Wage,
NWLC
(Nov.
30,
2012),
http://www.nwlc.org/resource/fair-pay-women -requires-increasing-minimumwage-and-tipped-minimum-wage (defining a minimum wage worker as
someone who earns the federal minimum wage or less).
91. Insecure and Unequal: Poverty and Income Among Women and
Families,
2000-2011,
NWLC
10
(2012),
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/nwlc_2012_ povertyreport.pdf.
92. See Women in the Labor Force: A Databook, supra note 79, at 2 (stating
that nearly 27 percent of all employed women are in part-time jobs, compared
to about 13 percent of men).
93. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, By Gender and by Age, an Unequal Recovery,
TIMES
(Feb.
8,
2013),
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/09/business/economy/recovery-has-broughtmore-jobs-for-men-than-women.html?_r=0 (quoting economist as saying that
“[w]omen are more likely to be employed by small service-sector companies
than by large manufacturers”).
94. Kathryn Kobe, Small Business Retirement Plan Availability and
Worker Participation, SMALL BUS. ADMIN., OFFICE OF ADVOCACY 4 (2010),
http://www.sba
.gov/sites/default/files/Small%20Business%20Retirement%20Plan%20Availabi
lity%20and%20Worker%20Participation%20(Full).pdf.
95. Minimum Participation Standards, 26 U.S.C.A. § 410(a)(1)(A) (West
2012); see also Minimum Participation Standards, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1052(a)(1)(A)3(A) (West 2012) (stating that employers who offer pension plans are not
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employers are not permitted to exclude from eligibility employees
who work at least 1,000 hours in a 12-month period on the basis of
their status as part-time workers, an employer may exclude a
group of employees based on a “reasonable classification,” such as
hourly paid employees (as opposed to salaried employees).96
Participation rates in employer-sponsored DC plans for
eligible low- and moderate-income workers have been historically
much lower than those of higher-income workers.97 Even when
low- and moderate-income workers participate, they simply have
less disposable income to put away for retirement. Although
participants can contribute up to $17,500 to a DC plan account per
year under current law, few workers, especially low- and
moderate-income workers, do so.98 Among women making a
contribution to a 401(k)-type plan in 2005, only six percent made
the maximum contribution, compared to almost 12% of men who
did so.99 Indeed, women’s mean contribution in 2005 was roughly
$3,500, while men’s mean contribution was $4,949 (almost $1,500
higher).100 Moreover, with lower account balances, high fees,
particularly fixed fees, will disproportionately affect low- and
moderate-income workers.101
required to include employees who work fewer than 1,000 hours in a 12-month
period, which is approximately 20 hours per week).
96. 26 C.F.R. § 1.410(b)-4; see also Employee Plans Determinations Quality
Assurance Bulletin: Part-Time Employees Revisited, FY-2006, No. 3, INTERNAL
REVENUE
SERV.
2
(Feb.
14,
2006),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/qab_021406.pdf (reiterating the legal standard from the Code Sections).
97. Craig Copeland, Ownership of Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs)
NOTES
6
fig.2
(May
2008),
and
401(k)-Type
Plans,
EBRI
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/EBRI_ Notes_05-2008.pdf [hereinafter Ownership of
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and 401(k)-Type Plans] (showing that,
for example, only 11% of workers with family income between $20,000 and
$29,999, compared to over 21% of workers with income between $50,000 and
$74,999, owned 401(k)-type plans).
98. Id. at 11 n.5. In 2005, only 1.3% of workers with a family income
between $20,000 and $29,999 and making a contribution to a 401(k) type plan
made the maximum contribution while 14.6% of those with incomes of $75,000
and up did so. Id. at 7 fig.3.
99. Id.
100. Id. Between 1990 and 2001, average annual contributions were $3,818
for men and $2,630 for women. See Barbara A. Butrica & Richard W. Johnson,
Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Differentials in Employer-Sponsored Pensions,
URBAN
INST.
8.n.2
(June
30,
2010),
THE
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/901357-racial-ethnic-genderdifferentials.pdf (citing Karen E. Smith, Richard W. Johnson & Leslie A.
Muller, Differing Income in Employer-Sponsored Retirement Plans: The
Dynamics of Participant Contributions, CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH AT BOSTON
COLL. (Aug. 2004), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2004/08/wp_2004201.pdf).
101. See, e.g., Comments on Proposed Regulations on Fiduciary
Requirements for Disclosure in Participant-Directed Individual Account Plans,
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In addition, low- and moderate-income workers are the most
likely to use DC plan account savings for non-retirement needs,
thus reducing savings targeted for retirement.102 Low-income
workers are, specifically, the most likely to cash out their DC plan
accounts after a job change, a tendency that is even more
problematic for retirement security because lower-income workers
have more job changes than higher-income workers over the
course of their working lives.103 Some research has further found
that women are more likely than men to spend lump sums
received from DC plan accounts after they leave a job to meet
expenses (rather than roll those amounts over into other
retirement savings vehicles),104 and there are ample opportunities
to do so, given that the average woman holds approximately 11
jobs during her working life.105 Thus, the effect of retirement
savings “leaking” out of DC plans can be significant for low- and
moderate-income working women. Indeed, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) estimated that preserving for
retirement all accumulated retirement savings alone would
increase the pension benefits of women in the three lowest income
quintiles, with the largest impact on the lowest quintiles.106 This is
so, despite the fact that current law requires employers to
automatically roll DC plan account savings over $1,000 into an
IRA when an employee changes jobs if the employee does not
affirmatively elect to roll the balance into another retirement
savings account or to receive the lump sum directly.107
In this Section, we discuss several options aimed at improving
the ability of low- and moderate-income working women to save

PENSION
RIGHTS
CTR.
4
(Sept.
8,
2008),
http://www.pensionrights.org/policy/regulations/pension_rights_center_
fee_comments.pdf (noting that if an investment fund imposed a $20 annual fee
on accounts with less than $10,000, a participant invested $1,000 per year and
had an average 2% annual return, the account balance would not have grown
at all over a five-year period).
102. Matt Fellowes & Katy Willemin, The Retirement Breach in Defined
Contribution Plans: Size, Causes, and Solutions, HELLOWALLET 9-11 (Jan.
2013), www.hellowallet.com/retirementbreach.
103. Id. at 10-11.
104. Lois Shaw & Catherine Hill, The Gender Gap in Pension Coverage:
What Does the Future Hold?, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RESEARCH 8-9 (2002),
http://www.iwpr
.org/publications/pubs/the-gender-gap-in-pension-coveragewhat-does-the-future-hold-final-report.
105. See Number of Jobs Held, Labor Market Activity, and Earnings Growth
Among the Youngest Baby Boomers, supra note 82 (describing how the average
woman born in the later years of the baby boom (individuals born from 1957 to
1964) held 11.1 jobs from age 18 to age 46).
106. Retirement Security: Women Face Challenges in Ensuring Financial
Security in Retirement, supra note 86, at 48.
107. 26 U.S.C.A. § 401(a)(31)(B).
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through the employer-sponsored retirement savings system,
including increasing coverage of part-time workers, lowering
vesting requirements, and improving savings vehicles and
incentives for low- and moderate-income workers.
1. Increasing Coverage of Part-Time Workers
Under current law, private-sector employers are not required
to extend retirement benefits to part-time workers (those working
less than approximately 20 hours per week).108 Less than 32
percent of part-time, full-year workers work for an employer that
offers a retirement plan for any worker, compared to over 58
percent of full-time, full-year workers.109 Just 18 percent of parttime, full-year workers participate in employer-offered retirement
plans compared to 52 percent of full-time, full-year workers.110
Women are more than twice as likely as men to work part-time,
either for their entire work lives or for a part of their careers.111 A
recent study by the Employee Benefit Research Institute found
that women’s lower probability of participating in an employersponsored retirement plan is the likely result of lower earnings
and lower rates of full-time work, as compared to men.112
One option for increasing low- and moderate-income women’s
retirement security, then, would be to require employers
sponsoring DC plans to cover part-time employees, for example, if
they work at least 500 hours of service per year.113 Employers
could require that part-time employees work for a year before
becoming eligible to participate in their DC plan, as permitted for
other eligible employees under ERISA.114

108. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1052(a)(1)(A)-3(A).
109. Craig Copeland, Employment-Based Retirement Plan Participation:
Geographic Differences and Trends, EBRI.ORG ISSUE BRIEF 10 (Oct. 2010),
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/ briefspdf/EBRI_IB_10-2010_No348_Participation.pdf
[hereinafter Employment-Based Retirement Plan Participation: Geographic
Differences and Trends].
110. Id. at 11.
111. See Women in the Labor Force: A Databook, supra note 79 (finding that
nearly 27 percent of all employed women are in part-time jobs, compared to
about 13 percent of men).
112. See Employment-Based Retirement Plan Participation: Geographic
Differences and Trends, supra note 109 (providing figures including workers
working for a union).
113. See Part-Time Worker Bill of Rights Act of 2013, H.R. 675, 113th Cong.
(2013) (proposing that workers who “customarily” work between 500 and 1,000
hours per year be eligible for pension coverage after 500 hours of service);
Women’s Retirement Security Act of 2006, S. 3951, 109th Cong. (2006)
(proposing requiring coverage of workers who worked at least 500 hours for 3
years).
114. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1052(a)(1)(A)(ii).
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Decrease Time Required for Employer Contributions to DC
Plan Accounts to Vest

As discussed above, women will hold over 11 jobs, on average,
during the course of their careers.115 And as discussed above, the
lowest-income workers (including women) are at the greatest risk
of “leaking” funds saved for retirement when they leave jobs. But
in addition to the risk that workers will withdraw DC plan account
funds pursuant to a job change (or a job loss), if workers leave jobs
after too short a period of time, they may lose out on employeematching contributions, if any.116 Under current law, workers who
contribute to a DC plan have immediate and full ownership over
their own contributions.117 However, if their employer makes a
matching contribution, workers only become vested in those
contributions either fully after three years (“cliff vesting”) or
gradually over a six-year period (“graduated vesting”).118 The
median job tenure for women is just over four and one-half
years,119 and more than half of women (18-46) have been with
their employers for less than two years.120 As a result, many
workers risk losing out on employer-matching contributions when
they leave an employer after a less-than-median tenure.
Women’s median job tenure is very similar to that of men (4.6
years versus 4.7 years in 2012).121 A statistical micro simulation by
the GAO in 2007 examined the effects of a reduced vesting
schedule (for cliff vesting, from three to two years, and for
graduated vesting, from six to three years).122 This model showed
115. Number of Jobs Held, Labor Market Activity, and Earnings Growth
Among the Youngest Baby Boomers, supra note 82.
116. See FAQs About Retirement Plans and ERISA, EMP. BENEFITS SEC.
ADMIN.,
U.S.
DEP’T.
OF
LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_consumer_pension.html (last visited Apr. 4,
2013) (explaining that employees may have to work for a company for a few
years before they are vested in the employer’s contribution).
117. What You Should Know About Your Retirement Plan, U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR,
EMP.
BENEFITS
SEC.
ADMIN.,
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/wyskapr.html (last visited Mar. 12,
2013).
118. See, e.g., id. (explaining when a participant has a right to accumulated
benefits).
119. See Employee Tenure Summary: Employee Tenure in 2012, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR 1 (Sept. 18, 2012),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ pdf/tenure.pdf [hereinafter Employee Tenure
Summary: Employee Tenure in 2012] (explaining that in 2012, the median
tenure for female wage and salary workers age 16 or older was 4.6 years,
whereas the median tenure for male wage and salary workers was 4.7 years).
120. Number of Jobs Held, Labor Market Activity, and Earnings Growth
Among the Youngest Baby Boomers, supra note 82, at tbl.2.
121. Employee Tenure Summary: Employee Tenure in 2012, supra note 119.
122. Retirement Security: Women Face Challenges in Ensuring Financial
Security in Retirement, supra note 86, at 45.

Do Not Delete

772

10/18/2013 4:29 PM

The John Marshall Law Review

[46:749

that median pension benefits increased for more eligible women
overall, compared to men, but grew the most for eligible women in
the lowest income quintile.123 Accordingly, policymakers should
consider lowering vesting requirements in order to improve the
retirement security of low- and moderate-income working women.
3. Increasing Investment Options and Incentives for Low- and
Moderate-Income Workers
For those workers whose employers offer DC plans, automatic
enrollment policies are projected to dramatically increase the
participation rates and retirement savings of lower-wage
workers.124 But many workers still lack access to a pension or
retirement savings plan at work. One policy proposal aimed at the
millions of Americans whose employers do not offer a retirement
plan that has received a great deal of support and attention over
123. Under the GAO micro simulation, the median pension benefit of
women in the lowest income quintile who were affected grew for over 16
percent, and by nearly 9 percent for women in the second-lowest income
quintile, compared to 6.29 percent for women overall and 5.74 percent for men
overall. Id. at 45-46. In 2006, the median job tenure for men aged 25 and
above was 5 years, compared to 4.8 years for women. Employee Tenure
Summary: Employee Tenure in 2012, supra note 119, at tbl.1.
124. Jack VanDerhei, The Impact of Automatic Enrollment in 401(k) Plans
on Future Retirement Accumulations: A Simulation Study Based on Plan
Design Modifications of Large Plan Sponsors, EBRI.ORG 1, 14 (Apr. 2010),
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/ EBRI_IB_04-2010_No341_Auto-Enroll1.pdf.
Automatic enrollment contemplates requiring employees to opt out of
enrollment in a 401(k) plan, rather than affirmatively elect to enroll. Id. at 14.
The Pension Protection Act of 2006 facilitated auto-enrollment. Pension
Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified as 26
U.S.C. § 401) (2006). But as of 2010, the majority of employers had not
adopted auto-enrollment policies. See Surveys and Statistics, Automatic 401(k)
Plans: Employer Views on Enrolling New and Existing Employees, AARP
(June
2010),
http://www.aarp.org/
work/retirement-planning/info-062010/auto401k.html (noting that only 42 percent of employers surveyed
offered 401(k) plans with automatic enrollment). For an employer that makes
all employees immediately eligible to participate in the 401(k) plan and
automatically enrolls all employees in the plan, participation increased from
37 percent to 86 percent. Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of
Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 THE
QUARTERLY J. ECON. 1159, tbl.IV (2001). In addition, assuming a lifetime of
work and continuous participation in 401(k) plans that featured autoenrollment, studies have projected significant increases in 401(k) account
balances. Jack VanderHei, The Impact of Automatic Enrollment in 401(k)
Plans on Future Retirement Accumulations: A Simulation Study Based on
Plan Design Modifications of Large Plan Sponsors, 341 EMP. BENEFIT RES.
INST.
5
(2010),
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_042010_No341_Auto-Enroll1.pdf (finding that the median 401(k) balance of the
lowest-income quartile of workers after being auto-enrolled in 401(k) plans
throughout their career would be over sixty times greater than under a purely
voluntary enrollment system).
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the past six years is the so-called “Automatic IRA.”125 The basic
premise of the Automatic IRA is that employers of a particular size
(such as those with ten or more employees) that do not sponsor
other retirement plans could establish payroll deduction IRAs for
their employees, with the option of automatically enrolling their
employees.126 The contribution level would start at three percent of
salary.127 Employers would not be required to contribute to
employee accounts or match employee contributions, and would
receive a tax credit to partially offset any costs associated with
establishing an Automatic IRA.128 The proposal contemplates that
third-party financial institutions would manage the IRAs, and
that, in order to limit participant confusion and to keep
administrative costs low, investment choices would be limited.129
As discussed further below, one safe and low-cost investment
choice that has been discussed, a new U.S. Treasury “R-bond,”
would be tailored to low- and moderate-income workers, and/or
“new savers.”130
The Automatic IRA proposal is generally thought to have the
potential to increase retirement savings and improve retirement
outcomes, particularly for moderate-income workers.131 The
proposal is expected to make between 24.4 and 35.8 million
workers who currently lack access to a retirement savings plan at
work eligible to participate in an Automatic IRA, with more than

125. See generally J. Mark Iwry & David C. John, Pursuing Universal
Retirement Security Through Automatic IRAs, 2007-2 BROOKINGS INST. 6-17
(2007),
http://www.
brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2007/4/universal%20retirement%
20iwry%20john/04_universal_retirement_iwry_john.pdf (discussing automatic
IRAs).
126. Id. at 6-17.
127. Automatic IRA Act of 2012, H.R. 4049, 112th Cong. § 408(B)(d)(4)(A)(i)
(2012).
128. See, e.g., Testimony on Retirement Security by David C. John,
Pursuing Universal Retirement Security Through Automatic IRAs and Account
HERITAGE
FOUND.
(Apr.
17,
2012),
Simplification,
THE
http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2012/
04/pursuing-universalretirement-security-through-automatic-iras-and-account-simplification (noting
that the Automatic IRA proposal would not require employers to match
employee savings but employers would have added benefit of a tax credit).
129. Iwry & John, supra note 125, at 21-24.
130. See, e.g., John, supra note 128 (discussing the proposal of an R-Bond
account that would allow new and small savers to accumulate retirement
savings).
131. Benjamin H. Harris & Rachel M. Johnson, Economic Effects of
Automatic Enrollment in Individual Retirement Accounts, AARP PUB. POL’Y
INST.
1
(2012),
http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/public_policy_institute/econ_s
ec/2012/Economic-Effects-of-Auto-IRA-Research-Report-AARP-ppi-econsec.pdf.
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80 percent of the eligible workers earning less than $50,000.132 The
Obama Administration proposed an Automatic IRA in its 20102013 Budget documents,133 and it has been introduced several
times in both houses of Congress.134
The Automatic IRA has generated a great deal of discussion.
But the proposal, despite its significant promise, has limitations.
First, Automatic IRAs, standing alone, would provide limited
benefits to the lowest-income workers.135 The Automatic IRA
proposal is estimated to increase annual IRA contributions, on
average, over $970 for automatically enrolled workers in the
lowest income quintile.136 But for workers who are closer to
retirement—for example, those who have fewer than twenty years
of work before them—savings from Automatic IRAs may not
meaningfully increase retirement security. Although, as one report
put it, “any additional savings, created by automatic IRAs, no
matter how small, will improve retirement security” for low- and
moderate-income workers,137 the benchmark for success with

132. Benjamin H. Harris & Ilana Fischer, The Population of Workers
Covered by the Auto IRA: Trends and Characteristics, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST.
1-2
(2012),
http://www.
aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/public_policy_institute/econ_sec/2012/Pop
ulation-of-Workers-Auto-IRA-Trends-and-Characteristics-Research-ReportAARP-ppi-econ-sec.pdf.
133. General Explanations of the Administration’s Revenue Proposals, Fiscal
DEP’T
OF
TREASURY
15-18
(Feb.
2012),
Year
2013,
U.S.
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/GeneralExplanations-FY2013.pdf; General Explanations of the Administration’s
Revenue Proposals, Fiscal Year 2012, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY 5-7 (Feb. 2011),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/
GeneralExplanations-FY2012.pdf; General Explanations of the Administration’s
Revenue Proposals, Fiscal Year 2011, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY 16–18 (Feb.
2010), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/GeneralExplanations-FY2011.pdf; General Explanations of the Administration’s
Revenue Proposals, Fiscal Year 2010, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY 7-9 (May 2009),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/GeneralExplanations-FY2010.pdf.
134. See Automatic IRA Act of 2012, H.R. 4049, 112th Cong. (2012);
Automatic IRA Act of 2011, S. 1557, 112th Cong. (2011); Automatic IRA Act of
2010, S. 3760, 111th Cong. (2010); Automatic IRA Act of 2010, H.R. 6099,
111th Cong. (2010); Automatic IRA Act of 2007, S. 1141, 110th Congress
(2007); Automatic IRA Act of 2007, H.R. 2167, 110th Cong. (2007) (following
introduction by Senator Jeff Bingaman in the U.S. Senate and Representative
Richard Neal in the U.S. House of Representatives).
135. HARRIS & FISCHER, supra note 132, at 5.
136. HARRIS & JOHNSON, supra note 131, at 14, tbl.9.
137. Barbara A. Butrica & Richard W. Johnson, How Much Might
Automatic IRAs Improve Retirement Security for Low- and Moderate-Wage
INST.
BRIEF
#33
6
(July
2011),
Workers?
URBAN
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412360-Automatic-IRAs-ImproveRetirement-Security.pdf.
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regard to low-and moderate-income workers can, and should, be
set higher.
This Article does not purport to add to the analysis of the
potential impact of the Automatic IRA proposal, standing alone, on
the retirement savings of low- and moderate-income workers, or to
compare the Automatic IRA proposal to other proposals intended
to increase retirement security for workers who cannot save for
retirement through their workplace.138 Instead, this Article seeks
to highlight two ancillary proposals that could enhance the impact
of the Automatic IRA upon low- and moderate-income savers, and
especially women—the potential for a government “match” in the
form of an improved Saver’s Credit and the implementation of the
R-bond as an investment option.
a. Improving the Saver’s Credit
Even when low- and moderate-income women workers can
participate in retirement savings plans, whether DC plans or the
Automatic IRA proposal, the fact remains that in order to save for
retirement, those workers must defer compensation. Low- and
moderate-income workers struggling to make ends meet often
cannot spare even small amounts from their paychecks,
particularly if they are single mothers. Therefore, some have
proposed supplementing the amounts that low- and moderateincome workers are able to save for retirement with a government
retirement savings match.139 Research has shown that the offer of
138. For a discussion of some alternative proposals, see generally Senator
Tom Harkin, The Retirement Crisis and a Plan to Solve It, S. COMM. ON
HEALTH
EDUC.
LABOR
&
PENSIONS
(July
2012),
http://www.harkin.senate.gov/documents/pdf/5011b69191eb4 .pdf (laying out a
two-part proposal involving the provision of universal access to “Universal,
Secure and Adaptable Retirement Funds” and the improvement of Social
Security by increasing benefits while strengthening the long-term finances of
the trust fund); David Madland, Making Savings for Retirement Easier,
Cheaper, and More Secure, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 2012),
http://www.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/09/MadlandBunkerRetirementBrief.pdf (discussing a
proposed collective defined-contribution plan and the expansion of the Thrift
Savings Plan); Retirement Security Funds, PENSION RIGHTS CTR.
http://www.pensionrights.org/sites/
default/files/docs/retirement_security_funds_full_summary.pdf (last visited
Mar. 7, 2013) (detailing Retirement Security Funds, a proposed private
retirement plan administered by private single-purpose institutions that
provide for risk-sharing, reverse matching, and lifetime income payouts);
State-Based Retirement Plans for the Private Sector, PENSION RIGHTS CTR.
(Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.pensionrights.org/issues/ legislation/state-basedretirement-plans-private-sector (describing the California Secure Choice
Retirement Savings Trust Act).
139. See, e.g., William G. Gale, A Proposal to Restructure Retirement
Savings Incentives in a Weak Economy with Long-Term Deficits, BROOKINGS
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a match makes tax filers more likely to save for retirement, and to
save more than those not offered the match.140
One proposal that has been introduced in a number of
contexts is based on the existing Saver’s Credit. Under current
law, the Saver’s Credit offers up to a 50 percent credit for up to
$2,000 in retirement savings by married couples filing joint tax
returns and earning less than $34,500, a 20 percent credit for
couples earning between $34,500 and $37,500, and a ten percent
credit for couples earning between $37,500 and $57,500.141 The
same credit rates apply for single or married filing separately and
head of household filing status, but at lower income levels.142
Because the Saver’s Credit is a nonrefundable tax credit, however,
it can only reduce tax liability down to zero.143 Thus, it offers little
incentive for low- and moderate-income tax filers, who are not
likely to have enough income tax liability to take full advantage of
the credit. Indeed, in 2005, only five percent of households with
income below $20,000 received any benefit from the Saver’s
Credit.144
Accordingly, most proposals to make the Saver’s Credit a
more effective incentive for low- and moderate-income savers have
focused on making the credit refundable, such that if the credit
eliminates the filer’s tax liability, he or she could then receive the
remainder of the credit as a cash refund.145 In 2005, the Tax Policy

(Sept.
8,
2011),
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/09/08retirement-incentives-gale (proposing the replacement of the current income
tax deduction for contributions to retirement savings accounts with a flat-rate
refundable credit that would be deposited directly into the saver’s account);
Teresa Ghilarducci, Guaranteed Retirement Accounts: Toward Retirement
Income Security, EPI Briefing Paper #204 THE ECON. POL’Y INST. 3 (Nov. 20,
2007), http://www.gpn.org/bp204/bp204.pdf (proposing a universal system of
retirement savings accounts with mandatory contributions in connection with
which employees would be eligible for a $600 refundable tax credit).
140. Esther Duflo et al., Savings Incentives for Low- and Middle-Income
Families: Evidence from a Field Experiment with H&R Block, MASS. INST. OF
TECH. 3 (2006), http://economics.mit.edu/files/801.
141. Form 8880: Credit for Qualified Retirement Savings Contributions,
INTERNAL REV. SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/f8880.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2013).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. William Gale, J. Mark Iwry & Peter R. Orszag, Improving Tax
Incentives for Low-Income Savers: The Saver’s Credit, THE URBAN INST. tbl.5
(June
2005),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411177_TPC_DiscussionPaper_2
2.pdf.
145. See, e.g., id. at 12-13 (discussing the tax benefits of making the credit
refundable). Some proposals contemplate reducing the size of the credit,
however, in order to limit the revenue impact. See, e.g., William G. Gale,
David C. John & Spencer Smith, New Ways to Promote Retirement Saving,
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Center estimated that making the Saver’s Credit refundable would
make the credit available to 49 million tax filers who under
current law received no benefit from the credit.146 The GAO
projected that making the Saver’s Credit refundable throughout a
worker’s lifetime would annually increase retirement income from
a DC plan for workers in the lowest income quartile by just over
$300.147 To further encourage the use of the refund for retirement
savings purposes, some proposals call for depositing any refund
from the credit into the retirement savings vehicle to which the
qualifying contributions were made, resulting in an effective
match.148
Further, some proposals have paired improving the Saver’s
Credit with the Automatic IRA proposal. For example, the Obama
Administration’s 2010 and 2011 budgets proposed converting the
Saver’s Credit to a refundable 50 percent match of qualified
retirement savings contributions up to $500 per individual
(indexed annually for inflation) combined with “automatic
enrollment in IRAs.”149 Studies have shown that combining an
expanded Saver’s Credit with the Automatic IRA, as proposed by
the Obama Administration, would increase the benefits for the
bottom three income quintiles more than would the Auto IRA
proposal alone.150 Assuming a high level of enrollment in
Automatic IRAs over a lifetime of work, the average increase in
yearly income at age 70 has been projected to be about $3,000 for
the very lowest-income workers,151 although this projection seems
AARP
PUB.
POL’Y
INST.
20-24
(October
2012),
http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/public_policy_institute/
econ_sec/2012/new-ways-promote-retirement-saving-AARP-pp-econ-sec.pdf
(proposing changing the Saver’s Credit to a 6.64% matching credit).
146. Gale, Iwry & Orzag, supra note 144, at 12.
147. GAO 11-333, Private Pensions: Some Key Features Lead to an Uneven
Distribution of Benefits, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 29-32, tbl.5
(Mar. 2011), http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/317137.pdf [hereinafter Private
Pensions: Some Key Features Lead to an Uneven Distribution of Benefits].
148. Gale, Iwry & Orzag, supra note 144, at 13; Gale, John & Smith, supra
note 145, at 20-24.
149. General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2010 Revenue
Proposals, supra note 133, at 6.
150. See Harris & Johnson, supra note 131, at 13 (providing that combining
the Saver’s Credit and the Automatic IRA would greatly benefit the lowest
three quintiles); Butrica & Johnson, supra note 137, at 3-6 (finding that
Automatic IRAs would improve participation rates and increase retirement
income, especially for retirees in the bottom and second-lowest income
quintiles).
151. Compare Butrica & Johnson, supra note 137, at 5-6 (projecting $3,000
increase in income), with Private Pensions: Some Key Features Lead to an
Uneven Distribution of Benefits, supra note 132, at 30-32 (projecting that
making Saver’s Credit refundable in conjunction with automatic enrollment in
DC plan would increase annual retirement income from a DC plan for workers
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highly optimistic. Thus, in conjunction with the Automatic IRA, an
expansion of the Saver’s Credit presents a promising option for
increasing the retirement security of low- and moderate-income
workers.
The primary argument made against the refundable Saver’s
Credit, standing alone, or a less generous improvement of the
credit in conjunction with an Automatic IRA proposal is cost. Yet
our tax system already subsidizes saving for retirement, but
provides the most generous subsidies to those who need them
least.152 The proposals discussed here would make the distribution
of these tax benefits somewhat more progressive.
b. The “R-Bond”
One retirement savings option for low- and moderate-income
savers that has drawn attention and interest over the past several
years has been savings bonds issued by the U.S. Department of
the Treasury.153 Savings bonds are seen as good investment
choices for low- and moderate-income savers because they are
familiar and trusted, offer stable returns, have few administrative
fees, can be purchased in a number of consumer-friendly ways, and
are available in multiple denominations. Under current law, tax
filers can direct part of their federal tax refund to purchase
savings bonds.154 In addition, the TreasuryDirect program allows
consumers to purchase savings bonds through payroll
deductions.155 Some IRA providers already offer savings bonds as
in the lowest quartile by about $559).
152. See, e.g., Private Pensions: Some Key Features Lead to an Uneven
Distribution of Benefits, supra note 147, at 19-25 (discussing different tax
subsidies); Gale, Iwry & Orzsag, supra note 144, at 1 (exploring types of tax
incentives for low-income families).
153. See, e.g., West Virginia Rural Retirement Project, WISER,
http://www.wiser women.org/index.php?id=39 (last visited Mar. 13, 2013)
(describing Rural Retirement Project, a grassroots effort that explored savings
vehicles for low-income, self-employed women); Peter Tufano & Daniel
Schneider, Reinventing Savings Bonds, Tax Analyst Special Report, TAX
NOTES
1
(Oct.
31,
2005),
http://www.d2dfund.org/
files/publications/Reinventing-Savings-Bonds.pdf (explaining the importance
of savings bonds for low- and moderate-income families); Savings Bond
Working Group, D2D FUND, http://www.d2dfund.org/sbwg (last visited Mar.
13, 2013) (describing the efforts of the “coalition of national and grassroots
non-profit organizations, commercial tax preparers, tax software firms, and
public officials” to encourage low- and moderate-income individuals to
purchase savings bonds).
154. See More Tax Refunds Paid, IRS Reminds Filers About Savings Bond
REVENUE
SERV.
(Mar.
14,
2011),
Option,
INTERNAL
http://www.irs.gov/uac/More-Tax-Refunds-Paid,-IRS-Reminds-Filers-AboutSavings-Bond-Option (explaining the various savings bonds available for tax
refunds).
155. The Payroll Savings Option in TreasuryDirect, TREASURYDIRECT,
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possible investment options.156
Some have proposed creating a savings bond that would serve
as a savings vehicle for retirement, dubbed an “R-Bond.”157 The Rbond would share characteristics with other savings bonds,
including portability, a wide range of denominations, and
guaranteed investment returns. Further, the R-bond would receive
the same income tax treatment as an IRA, including deferral of
tax on interest and early withdrawal penalties. In addition,
contributions to an R-Bond would qualify for the Saver’s Tax
Credit.158 Others have described the R-Bond as a small, no-fee
account, backed by Treasury bonds.159 The account would be
administered by the U.S. Treasury Department, tracked by the
owner’s Social Security number, and could include rollover
retirement savings from a variety of sources.160 There would be no
fees associated with the R-bond.161 Another possibility would be for
R-bonds to be paid out in the form of lifetime income payments at
retirement.
Recently, proponents of Automatic IRAs have integrated the
R-Bond proposal as a potential investment option for low- and
moderate-income, as well as “new,” savers.162 For example, federal
legislation introduced in 2012 would create Automatic IRAs that
allow employers to facilitate employee contributions to either an
http://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/products/prod_tdpayrollinfo.htm
(last
updated July 3, 2012).
156. See, e.g., Choosing Investments for Your IRA, FIDELITY.COM (July
2012),
https://www.fidelity.com/retirement-planning/learn-about-iras/irachoosing-investments (describing IRA investments).
157. See Sean Luechtefeld, Innovation Update: Diane Browning, CFED
(July
28,
2010,
3:17
PM),
http://cfed.org/blog/innovation/innovation_update_diane_browning/ (describing
R-Bond).
158. See id. (explaining that R-Bonds are different than other bonds because
they qualify for the Saver’s Credit); Diane L. Browning, Simplify Savings for
Retirement: Create a U.S. Retirement R-Bond, WISER RURAL RET. PROJECT 1–
2,
https://www.wiserwomen.org/images/imagefiles/U%20S%20RetirementBond2_
F.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2013) (describing ability to claim contributions to
the R-Bond for a refundable Saver’s Credit as a positive feature of the
proposed R-Bond).
159. Gale, John & Smith, supra note 145, at 11-12.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See John, supra note 128 (explaining that R-bond accounts are one type
of simple investment choice that could be offered through Automatic IRAs);
Mark Iwry Speaks About Retirement at the National Press Foundation, RET.
INCOME J., http://retirementincomejournal.com/upload/567/pdf/mark-iwryspeaks-about-retirement-at-the-national-press-foundation.pdf (last visited
Mar. 8, 2013) (providing a summary of Mark Iwry’s comments to journalists
that included a description of R-bonds as minimal risk bonds that could meet
the needs of small account holders).
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IRA or “a qualified retirement bond.”163 The legislation defines a
“retirement bond” as a bond that credits interest based on
duration, is inflation-protected, and is not transferable.164 The
legislation states that the purpose of the retirement bond program
is to provide “new savers with a convenient, low-cost investment
option” for small contributions.165 The retirement bond would be
capped at a certain amount, such as $5,000, at which point, it has
been proposed, the funds could be rolled into an account managed
by private financial services companies or an employer-sponsored
retirement savings plan account.166 Further, the legislation
contemplates that individuals could remain invested in retirement
bonds, but “reflect[s] the intent that the long-term investment of
automatic IRA funds for most savers be in the private market
rather than in retirement bonds.”167 In all other regards, the
legislation gives authority to the Secretary of the Treasury to
promulgate regulations to implement and administer retirement
bonds.168
The R-bond proposal offers a safe, low-cost vehicle for starting
new and low-income savers on the path to more significant
retirement savings.169 R-bonds thus present one stable investment
option for Automatic IRAs, although other proposals may offer
higher, but still stable, investment returns.170
B. Improve Access to Lifetime Income Options
One of the many challenges faced by retirees is making their
savings last a lifetime. All retirees face the challenge of ensuring
that they do not outlive their savings, but women are at a higher
risk of doing so because they have fewer savings, but a longer life
expectancy.171 As a result, the availability of annuities and other
163. Automatic IRA Act of 2012, H.R. 4049, 112th Cong.
§ 408(B)(d)(1)(B)(i)(I) (2012).
164. H.R. 4049, § 408(B)(g)(1).
165. H.R. 4049, § 408(B)(f)(5)(A).
166. See John, supra note 128 (stating that when accumulated retirement
funds in an R-bond reached a specified level, they would be rolled over to
private investment accounts).
167. H.R. 4049, § 408(B)(f)(5)(B).
168. H.R. 4049, § 408(B)(f)(6).
169. H.R. 4049, § 408(B)(f)(5)(A).
170. See, e.g., Lewis Mandell et al., Real Savings+ An Automatic Investment
Option for the Automatic IRA, ASPEN INST. INITIATIVE ON FIN. SEC. 13, 16
(Dec.
17,
2009),
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/RealSaving
s%2B_Complete.pdf (proposing a new investment option for “low- and
moderate-income savers”, RealSavings+, that would grow investments with
reduced risks of loss).
171. See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text (providing data and
sources regarding women’s life expectancy and retirement savings rates).
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guaranteed lifetime income streams, in addition to the
guaranteed, inflation-adjusted lifetime benefits provided by Social
Security, is critical to ensuring women’s retirement security.172
Access to various lifetime income options depends largely on
the source of retirement savings. The default retirement benefit
for workers participating in traditional defined benefit (DB)
pension plans is lifetime income in the form of a monthly annuity
payment. Further, DB annuities are calculated without regard to
gender, as required by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.173
In addition, DB plans offer retirement protection for spouses.174
Under the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA), the default form
of benefit for married participants is a joint-and-survivor annuity,
and a participant’s spouse must agree to receive benefits in a
different form,175 which tends to benefit women.
However, over the past 30 years, the number of workers
participating in DB plans has dramatically decreased, while the
number of workers participating in DC plans has grown
exponentially. Few DC plans offer participants the option of
receiving their DC plan account balance as an annuity.176 Because
DC plans typically pay out in lump sums at retirement, workers
bear the responsibility of managing their account balances so they
can provide additional support over their lifetimes and, for many,
the lifetime of a surviving spouse. In addition, an increasing
number of DB plans offer lump-sum payouts, thereby decreasing
the proportion of workers with access to lifetime income even
further.177 As a result, the number of workers (and their spouses)
with access to lifetime income from an employer-sponsored

172. See, e.g., John, supra note 128 (explaining that Automatic IRAs would
provide retirement savings plans to portions of the population who currently
do not have adequate retirement savings, including women).
173. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 701 (1964)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012)).
174. See Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, § 203(a), 98
Stat. 1426 (1984) (providing that DB plans must establish qualified joint and
survivor annuities and preretirement survivor annuities as the default form of
benefit for married participants).
175. See id. § 203(b) (providing that spouse must consent in writing before a
notary public if a married participant elects a form of benefit other than the
default joint-and-survivor annuity).
176. See Michael J. Brien & Constantijn W.A. Panis, Annuities in the
Context of Defined Contribution Plans, U.S. DEP’T. LABOR 12 (Nov. 2011),
http://www.dol.gov/ ebsa/pdf/Deloitte2011.pdf (citing BLS data indicating that
only fifteen percent of retirement savings and thrift plans offered participants
an annuity option).
177. Sudipto Banerjee, Annuity and Lump-Sum Decisions in Defined Benefit
EBRI.ORG
4
(Jan.
2013),
Plans:
The
Role
of
Plan
Rules,
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI _IB_01-13.No381.LSDs1.pdf (stating
that most DB plans now offer lump sum payouts).
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retirement plan has decreased dramatically in recent years.
If women are unable to take their pension benefits and
retirement savings in the form of an annuity through an employersponsored plan, they may use funds from DC plan accounts (or
lump-sums from DB plans) or IRAs to purchase annuities and
other lifetime income options from insurance companies. Many
individuals may be unwilling to purchase annuities with savings
because, among other things, they want to maintain asset
liquidity, or leave bequests to their heirs.178 But the cost of
annuities from private insurance providers may be prohibitive for
lower- and moderate-income workers, including women. For
example, small annuities purchased from insurance companies are
generally burdened by high fees and low effective rates of return,
which can reduce their attractiveness, notwithstanding the value
of a lifetime stream of income. In addition, insurance companies
offer lifetime income options with a dizzying array of features,
such as the option to provide death benefits to a beneficiary, or for
the annuitant to opt out of the annuity at a certain point, or
inflation adjustment, which increase costs and further reduce
retirement income. Moreover, many products on the market are
called annuities, but are actually investment vehicles rather than
sources of secure lifetime retirement income.179 Further,
individuals who purchase annuities on the open market face the
risk of the insurance company offering the annuity going out of
business or filing for bankruptcy, and thus becoming unable to
fulfill its obligation, in full or in part, to provide the annuitant
with lifetime income.180
In addition, and of particular concern to women, annuity
products offered by insurance companies are generally priced
178. See Jeffrey R. Brown, Financial Education and Annuities, 8 OECD
JOURNAL: GENERAL PAPERS 173 (2008) (stating that although annuities can
provide valuable insurance against longevity risks, people are reluctant to
purchase annuities for a number of reasons).
179. Letter from Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr. et al. to Office of Regulations and
Interpretations, Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin. 9 (May 30, 2010),
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1210-AB33-640.pdf.
180. State insolvency guaranty funds provide some relief from that risk, up
to
certain
levels
of
liability.
See
State
Guarantee
Funds,
ANNUITYADVANTAGE.COM,
http://www.annuityadvantage.com/stateguarantee.htm (last visited Apr. 28,
2010) (setting out the liability limits for each state). Depending on the state,
the state guaranty fund may not protect out-of-state residents. See Kenneth S.
Apfel & Michael J. Graetz, Uncharted Waters: Paying Benefits from
Individuals Accounts in Federal Retirement Policy, NAT’L ACAD. OF SOCIAL
INSURERS
82
(2005),
http://www.nasi.org/sites/default/
files/research/Uncharted_Waters_Report.pdf (explaining the importance of
jurisdictional boundaries because of the varying state laws that apply to
annuities).
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using gender-distinct mortality tables, which can amount to an
appreciable decrease in retirement income for women. For
example, a 64-year-old woman living in the District of Columbia
who used $34,000 in savings to purchase a single-life annuity
would receive monthly payments of $170, compared to the $186
per month that a man of the same age would receive; similarly, a
woman would receive $351 per month from an annuity purchased
with $70,000 while a man would receive $383 per month.181
Moreover, if an annuity is purchased from an insurance company,
federal law does not protect the interests of women as spouses by
requiring spouses to give written consent if the worker takes
benefits in a form other than an annuity that provides a benefit to
the surviving spouse.
This Section examines several options for increasing access to
lifetime income through employer-sponsored DC plans, as well as
improving the lifetime income options available to women from
private insurance companies.
1. Employer-Based Retirement Savings Plans
The following policies present options for increasing access to
lifetime income options from DC plans, the predominant form of
employer-sponsored retirement plans.
a. Requiring DC Plans to Offer Lifetime Income Options
Research indicates that women are more likely than men to
choose annuities when given the option.182 Recent research further
suggests that making an annuity the default form of benefit, as it
is for DB plans, would increase the number of plan participants
electing annuities.183 In addition, if plans were required to offer
lifetime income options, it would be expected that the price of
annuities would drop further as increasing numbers of
participants select annuities. Thus, in order to expand lifetime
income options and improve women’s retirement security,
employers could at least be required to offer lifetime income
options in their DC plans.
181. See INSTANT ANNUITY CALCULATOR, http://immediateannuities.com
(providing the calculator used in the search run by NWLC Jan. 25, 2013).
182. Julie R. Agnew et al., Who Chooses Annuities? An Experimental
Investigation of Gender, Framing and Defaults, 1 (Dec. 18, 2007),
http://www.aeaweb.org/annual_mtg_ papers/2008/2008_655.pdf.
183. Robert Gazzale et al., Do Default and Longevity Annuities Improve
Annuity Take-Up Rates? Result from an Experiment, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST.
11
(Oct.
2012),
http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/public_policy_institute/econ_s
ec/2012/annuities-take-up-rates-experiment-AARP-ppi-econ-sec.pdf (showing
percentage of participants choosing annuity increasing from 28 to 51 percent
when annuity, rather than lump-sum, was default).
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b. Partial Annuitization
Research has shown that some individuals may be unwilling
to purchase annuities because they are reluctant to lose access to
their retirement savings by locking those funds into an annuity.184
Lack of access to savings may be a particular concern for low- and
moderate-income women who may have few other cash reserves.
Reflecting the cogency of this concern, experts, consulted for a
recent GAO study, recommended that individuals in the lowestincome quintile accumulate some cash savings before annuitizing
some portion of their retirement savings, while recommending
that individuals in the middle-income quintile annuitize
approximately half of their retirement savings.185
Partial annuitization is one option that would permit DC plan
participants to provide themselves with some additional lifetime
income to supplement Social Security, while maintaining access to
the remainder of the funds in the account to meet unexpected
needs. Both the Federal Thrift Savings Plan and some privatesector retirement plans such as TIAA-CREF allow participants to
receive their account balance in the combined form of lifetime
income payments and a lump-sum payment. The evidence
suggests that many DB plan participants would elect partial
annuity options, if they were available.186
One concern that a partial annuitization option presents,
which is especially relevant for low- and moderate-earning women,
is whether annuitizing only a portion of DC account balances when
those accounts are, on average, modest, makes sense. Account
balances below a certain amount present administrative burdens
and are unlikely to result in significant monthly lifetime income
payments. Yet, even relatively small amounts of dependable
lifetime income can be significant for low- and moderate-income
workers as supplements to Social Security. In addition, DB plans
and the federal Thrift Savings Plan contemplate very small
monthly payments—DB plans must annuitize benefits with a
present value in excess of $5,000,187 and the Federal Thrift

184. See generally Brown, supra note 178 (explaining that a number of
concerns discourage people from purchasing annuities).
185. GAO 11-400, Retirement Income: Ensuring Income Throughout
Retirement Requires Difficult Choices, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 18
(2011), http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/319385.pdf.
186. See Lifetime Income RFI Comment Letter 3, TIAA-CREF 29 (Apr. 30,
2010), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1210-AB33-625.pdf (stating that “[i]n
recent years, TIAA-CREF has found that approximately 30 percent of those
who begin an income stream will choose to annuitize some portion of their
assets. Approximately 17 percent of those beginning an income stream choose
to fully annuitize”).
187. Minimum Vesting Standards, 26 U.S.C.A. § 411(a)(11) (West 2013).
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Savings Plan must do so for account balances above $3,500.188
Thus, policymakers should consider requiring employers to offer
the option for employees to partially annuitize their DC plan
accounts as one option for increasing access to lifetime income for
DC plan participants.
c.

Rollovers

Despite the risk of “leakage” of retirement savings, to which
low- and moderate-income workers are particularly susceptible,
many workers may have accumulated retirement savings from
different jobs over their careers.
Under current law, workers with retirement savings in an
employer-based plan can either keep the account balance in the
employer’s plan (if they have more than $5,000 in savings), or roll
the account balance into another tax-qualified retirement savings
account—such as another DC plan, if it accepts rollover
contributions, or, more likely, an IRA.189 Thus, as a worker nears
retirement, he or she may have retirement savings in one or more
employer-based retirement savings accounts, and/or in one or more
IRAs.
Unfortunately, unless an individual could aggregate his or
her accumulated retirement savings in a DC plan account that
offered a lifetime income payout, he or she would be unable to use
a DC plan to maximize his or her lifetime income payments. Under
current law, a DC plan may, but is not required to, accept rollovers
from other qualified retirement accounts.190 Although a worker
could aggregate rollover funds in an IRA, purchasing an annuity
from a private insurance company has financial penalties,
especially for women, as discussed above. Requiring plan
administrators to accept such rollovers, therefore, is another
option that could increase access to meaningful lifetime income
options.191

188. Protections for Spouses and Former Spouses, 5 U.S.C.A. § 8435(g)
(West 1996).
189. 26 U.S.C.A. § 408(d)(3)(A) (West 2010), amended by Pub. L. No. 112240, 126 Stat 2313 (2013). Workers can also withdraw some or all of the
account balance, subject to a tax penalty, if they are not yet of retirement age.
Annuities; Certain Proceeds of Endowment and Life Insurance Contracts, 26
U.S.C. § 72(t)(1) (West 2012).
190. 26 U.S.C.A. § 401(a)(31)(E); Requirement to Offer Direct Rollover of
Eligible Rollover Distributions; Questions and Answers, 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.401(a)(31)-1, Q-13 (West 2007).
191. The Treasury Department recently issued a revenue ruling that is
intended to encourage employers with both DC and DB plans to allow plan
participants to roll DC account balances into the DB plan to increase the size
of the DB annuity at retirement. I.R.S. Rev. Rul. 2012-4, 2012-8 I.R.B. 386
(2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/irb/2012-08_IRB/ar08.html.
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2. Improving Annuity Products
A significant amount of retirement assets are deposited in
IRAs as rollovers from 401(k) or other DC accounts when
individuals leave a job before retiring.192 Individuals may thus
have more assets with which to purchase lifetime income
payments in an IRA than in their current 401(k) or other DC plan.
But women face disadvantages when seeking to do so on the open
market, as discussed above.
For all of these reasons, policymakers should strongly
consider improving annuity products offered by insurance
companies so that they offer better lifetime income options for
women—particularly if a proposal like the Automatic IRA, which
would dramatically increase the number of IRA accountholders,
were implemented.193 One important improvement would be
eliminating sex-discriminatory pricing by insurance companies,
similar to the ban on gender rating in health insurance policies
effectuated by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.194
Additional improvements could take the form of uniform policies
by state insurance industry regulators, or changes in federal law
to ensure that protections are available to individuals purchasing
annuities in every state. These protections could include creating
standard, low-cost alternatives (whether offered under the
auspices of a government clearinghouse, retirement savings bonds,
or other low-fee, reliable lifetime income options) to the annuity
products currently available to individuals on the market.
C. Target Leakage of Marital Pension Benefits and Retirement
Savings
One consequence of women’s lower lifetime earnings and
concomitantly smaller amounts of retirement savings is that
women are more likely than men to rely on their spouses’
retirement benefits. For example, one recent study indicated that
192. See Craig Copeland, Individual Retirement Account Plans: An Analysis
of the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances, with Market Adjustments to June
2009, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. 4 fig.1, 24 fig.12b (Aug. 2009),
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/
briefspdf/EBRI_IB_8-2009_No333_SCF.pdf
[hereinafter Individual Retirement Account Plans] (explaining that in 2008,
$3.61 trillion dollars in retirement assets were held in private-sector IRAs,
mostly as a result of rollovers from 401(k)s or other defined contribution
accounts).
193. See Automatic IRA Act of 2012, H.R. 4049, 112th Cong. § 4(a)(2) (2012)
(directing the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Labor to jointly
conduct a study of the feasibility and desirability of “promoting the use of lowcost annuities, longevity insurance, or other guaranteed lifetime income
arrangements in automatic IRA arrangements. . . .”).
194. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 1557, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
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in 2012, over 21 percent of all women aged 60 and over received
DB pension income from their spouse’s former employer, compared
to about seven percent of men.195 However, although Congress
established robust spousal protections for traditional DB pension
plans, the same protections do not apply to DC plans or IRAs,
where the bulk of private retirement savings are found.
Pension benefits and retirement savings accrued during a
marriage are generally considered marital property under state
law, under the theory that they represent deferred compensation
for the productive efforts of the working spouse.196 And ERISA
provides mechanisms for effectuating the division of pension
benefits pursuant to a divorce decree.197 Yet, women are often at
risk of foregoing their share of pension benefits during a divorce,
whether because they are trading future retirement income for
current income or assets, because they are unaware of their
spouse’s pension or retirement savings plan accounts, or because
their attorney (if any) does not competently deal with pensionrelated issues. This Section discusses a number of options that
would increase protections for spouses in employer-sponsored
retirement savings plans and IRAs in intact marriages, and
mechanisms for ensuring that spouses’ share of pensions and
retirement savings are available for division at divorce.
1. Extend Spousal Protections to Defined Contribution Plans
The REA’s requirement of the joint and survivor spousal
annuity as the default form of benefit only applies to married DC
plan participants if they elect to receive their benefits in the form
of a life annuity. This discrepancy in ERISA means that spouses
lack the legal right to participate in the decision of whether the
DC plan account balance will be received as a lump sum or as an
annuity at retirement. There is only one circumstance in which a
participant in a DC plan must obtain spousal consent: if a
participant in a DC plan declines to choose an annuity form of
benefit, he or she must obtain spousal consent before designating a
beneficiary other than the spouse who would receive the account
balance if the participant died while participating in the plan.198

195. Porell & Oakley, supra note 71, at 6.
196. LESLIE JOAN HARRIS, JUNE CARBONE & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY
LAW 422-38 (4th ed. 2010).
197. See Form and Payment of Benefits, 29 U.S.C. §1056(d) (2012)
(concerning “assignment or alienation of plan benefits” and domestic relations
orders).
198. See Definitions and Special Rules for Purposes of Minimum Survivor
Annuity Requirements, 26 U.S.C. § 417(a)(2) (2012) (providing that a
participant’s spouse must consent in writing in order for the participant to
elect a form of benefit other than a joint and survivor annuity).
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But no spousal consent is required if the participant retires or
changes jobs and decides either to withdraw the account balance
as a lump sum, or to roll the account balance into an IRA. Further,
although spouses may have rights under state community
property law,199 IRA account holders are not required, under
federal law, to obtain spousal consent to either elect to receive
account funds in a form other than a joint and survivor annuity, or
designate a beneficiary other than a spouse.200 As a result, if DC
plan account funds are rolled over into an IRA following a job
change or retirement, those funds are shielded from joint decisionmaking, and can be placed out of the reach of spouses when they
need it most, in an intact marriage.
Industry groups have argued that ERISA’s qualified joint
survivor annuity (QJSA) requirement is overly burdensome and
should be restricted or eliminated because many spouses consent
to the waiver of a QJSA.201 But this assertion ignores the fact that
the waiver of a QJSA means the legal protection is operating as
intended: unless there has been fraud, the spouse has participated
in a joint decision about marital pension benefits. Without that
legal right, the worker spouse can unilaterally decide how pension
benefits are received. Particularly because women tend to outlive
their spouses, decisions about retirement income are critically
199. For federal income tax purposes, IRAs are deemed to be separate
property. 26 U.S.C. § 408(g). But federal tax law does not abrogate community
property rights under applicable state law. See, e.g., I.R.S. P.L.R. 199937055
(Sept. 17, 1999) (finding that community property-based rights to IRAs should
be determined under applicable state law). Specifically, in states that have
adopted community property regimes (Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin and, to a limited extent,
Alaska and Puerto Rico), spouses have rights to IRA assets, even if the IRA is
titled in the other spouse’s name alone, if the assets were earned or acquired
during the marriage (except as an inheritance or gift to one spouse). Id.; see,
e.g., Individual Retirement Account Beneficiary Designation Form, WELLS
FARGO
ADVANTAGE
FUNDS,
http://www.wellsfargoadvantagefunds.com/pdf/forms/desig_bene.pdf
(listing
community property states where spousal consent may be necessary when the
beneficiary is not a spouse). As a result, many IRA providers require spousal
consent when an IRA beneficiary other than a spouse is designated and there
is a nexus between the IRA owner and a community property state. Id.
200. Charles DelaFuente, Spouse’s Consent Is Required to Change
Retirement Account Beneficiary, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/
business/retirementspecial/spousesconsent-is-required-to-change-retirement-account-beneficiary.html.
201. See, e.g., Lifetime Income RFI Comment Letter, DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION INSTITUTIONAL INV. ASS’N
14
(May
3,
2010),
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1210-AB33-656.pdf
(explaining
that
“most
participants and beneficiaries waive the QJSA and QPSA benefits even when
they are available, and implementing the survivor annuity rules creates
significant costs and administrative burdens due to the notice, waiver,
revocation and spousal consent requirements.”).
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important to female spouses. Accordingly, policymakers should
seriously consider improving spousal rights to pensions by making
the default form of benefit from DC plans a joint and survivor
annuity, or its equivalent, if spousal consent is not obtained.
2. Evaluating Spousal Rights to Individual Retirement Accounts
(IRAs)
With IRA assets totaling over $4.7 trillion,202 in large part
from rollovers from DC plan accounts, and potentially growing
even more if Automatic IRAs are implemented,203 spouses lack any
legal rights under federal law to participate in decisions regarding
a substantial pool of retirement wealth. As a result, the time is
right for a serious discussion of improving spousal protections in
IRAs. Whether modeled on rights to marital assets under state
community property law204 or the spousal protections applicable to
either DB or DC plans under ERISA, or some other principle,
designing a logical and fair system of spousal protections would
close a glaring loophole in retirement savings policy.
3. Protect Spouses’ Interests in Retirement Assets at Divorce
Divorce is financially costly for both men and women, but
women fare worse economically than men following a divorce.
Following a divorce, women are more likely to experience a drop in
their standard of living.205 This decline in income can make it more
difficult for women to save for a secure retirement: a recent study
on the retirement prospects of divorced women found that one in
three divorced women born between 1966 and 1975 are expected to

202. Craig
Copeland,
Individual
Retirement
Account
Balances,
Contributions, and Rollovers, 2010: The EBRI IRA Database, EBRI ISSUE
BRIEF 14 fig.A (May 2012), http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_052012_No371_IRAs.pdf.
203. See Automatic IRA Act of 2012, H.R. 4049 (directing the Secretary of
the Treasury and the Secretary of Labor to jointly conduct a study of the
feasibility and desirability of “[e]xtending to automatic IRA arrangements
spousal consent requirements similar to, or based on, those that apply under
the Federal Employees’ Thrift Savings Plan, including consideration of
whether modifications of such requirements are necessary to apply them to
automatic IRA arrangements”).
204. See also Ghilarducci, supra note 139, at 3 (noting that the
“contributions of husbands and wives are combined and divided equally
between their individual accounts”).
205. ERISA Advisory Council, supra note 87; Women Face Challenges in
Ensuring Financial Security in Retirement, supra note 86, at 22; see also GAO
12-699, Retirement Security: Women Still Face Challenges, U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
28-31
(2012),
http://aging.senate.gov/events/hr250gao.pdf (describing drop in assets for
women who divorce over age 50).
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have low incomes and high poverty rates in retirement.206
In addition, women are at risk for losing out on retirement
assets that were accrued prior to divorce. Retirement savings
earned during a marriage are generally considered marital
property and as such are divisible at divorce under the law of
every state. Anecdotally, practitioners have noted that in many
divorces, women have fewer retirement assets than their male
spouses.207 But women may be inclined to “trade off” the future
benefits of pensions for other assets (like the family home), or may
not make obtaining a share of a pension a priority while focused on
more immediate issues (such as child custody or support, or
domestic violence).208 In addition, even when the parties intend to
include pensions and retirement savings in divorce proceedings,
many women may be unfamiliar with the details of their spouse’s
pensions or retirement savings, making it less likely that they will
receive the retirement assets to which they are entitled under the
law.209 Further, the valuation and division of pensions and
retirement savings at divorce is an extremely complex area of the
law. Many practitioners lack expertise with the different legal
requirements for different kinds of retirement plans.210 As a result,
even if a former spouse was able to obtain the appropriate share of
pension benefits or retirement savings during the divorce, legal
206. See Barbara A. Butrica & Karen E. Smith, The Retirement Prospects of
SEC.
BULLETIN
(2012),
Divorced
Women,
72-1
SOC.
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v72n1/v7 2n1p11.html (detailing how
divorce trends implicate women’s retirement security generally and their
Social Security benefits specifically).
207. ERISA Advisory Council, supra note 87.
208. See, e.g., Financial Issues When Divorcing, DIVORCE HQ (Mar. 2, 2013),
http://www.divorcehq.com/divorce-financial-issues.shtml
(warning
that
individuals should consult professionals before deciding whether to relinquish
rights to their share of pensions because “[p]ension plans . . . can be used as a
bargaining chip when negotiating . . . [a] final settlement agreement[,] . . . but
. . . trading off the pension for an asset may not be in [their] best interest. . .
.”).
209. ERISA Advisory Council, supra note 87 (“[o]btaining information is
particularly difficult . . . when a company has been through a merger,
consolidation or name change.”). Additionally, when companies fail to provide
necessary information, “it is difficult and time consuming to get the
information through other means.” Id.
210. See, e.g., Dividing Pension Property: Underrated Malpractice Concerns,
NAT’L LEGAL RESEARCH GRP. (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.qdrodesk.com/qdro/
Dividing-Pension-Property-Underrated-Malpractice-105.shtml (stating that
“[p]ensions are without question the least understood property that family law
attorneys routinely divide.”); An Interview with Judge McCarthy, Lack of
Preparation for Court Costs Clients, the System and the Lawyers, FAM. LAW.
MAG.
10
(Nov.
2012),
http://www.divorcemarketinggroup.com/dmg/fb/FLB/2012flm-november.pdf
(stating that “[m]ost people’s primary asset is their pension and retirement,
and lawyers today are still ill-equipped to properly deal with dividing those.”).
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and technical errors may make it difficult for the spouse to
actually receive her share of those benefits.211 Problems obtaining
the appropriate share of pensions and retirement benefits can be
further exacerbated when individuals represent themselves, which
is becoming increasingly common, especially for low- and
moderate-income individuals.212
When pensions are not included, or are unfairly or incorrectly
divided, in divorce settlements, divorced women can face
retirement at a particular disadvantage. The Pension Protection
Act of 2006 prohibited pension plan administrators from rejecting
Qualified Domestic Relations Orders simply because they were
issued after the date of a divorce decree, but did nothing that
would facilitate the fair division of pension benefits in the first
instance.213 Thus, additional steps should be taken to improve
protections for spouses with regard to marital pension benefits
during the divorce process. Further, the Department of Labor
should more widely publicize, and make available to family law
practitioners and state courts, information about the kinds of
benefits that can be awarded under ERISA and links to the
Department’s model QDRO forms.
Although the divorce process contemplates bargaining and
trade-offs of different assets and income, including pension
benefits and retirement assets, policymakers should consider
policy changes to ensure that women know about marital pension
benefits and retirement savings to which they may be entitled, to
preserve pension benefits and retirement assets subject to division
at divorce, and to facilitate the division and payout of such
benefits. For example, federal legislation was introduced in the
past providing that a domestic relations order (DRO) entered upon
the dissolution of a marriage that lasted for at least five years
shall be “deemed” a DRO specifying that the former spouse is
entitled to 50 percent of the marital share of the participant
211. See ERISA Advisory Council, supra note 87 (outlining various issues
related to the court orders that effectuate the division of pension benefits or
retirement assets, including the timing of and the standards for such orders
that apply to different kinds of pension plans).
212. See, e.g., Robert Eckhart, Courts Seeing More Do-It-Yourself Divorces,
SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, (Sept. 9, 2012), http://www.heraldtribune.com/
article/20120909/ARTICLE/120909620?p=6&tc=pg
(reporting
anecdotal
evidence that pro se divorces have increased during the economic downturn);
John T. Broderick & Ronald M. George, A Nation of Do-It-Yourself Lawyers,
TIMES
(Jan.
1,
2010),
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/02/opinion/02broderick.html (noting increase
in pro se litigants “in cases involving life-altering situations like divorce” due
to economic conditions).
213. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1001, 120
Stat. 780 (2006) (authorizing regulations to ensure that qualified domestic
relations orders do not fail to be treated as such by pension administrators).
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spouse’s accrued benefit, and would be recognized as a Qualified
Domestic Relations Order under ERISA.214 California provides an
alternative method for default division of retirement benefits: a
provisional order that awards each party 50 percent of all
retirement benefits accrued during a marriage as well as survivor
benefits, “subject to an adjustment by a later domestic relations
order.”215
Another approach would require pension plans to “hold”
the participant’s interest in the pension, disallowing any
distributions, when provided with specific written notice of a
pending divorce proceeding to allow the spouse the opportunity to
obtain a QDRO or other court order to allocate retirement benefits.
The plan participant could lift the hold by providing the plan
administrator with a document signed by the non-participant
spouse and approved by the court. Such a document could also
serve to help educate the parties (and possibly their attorneys)
about their rights to pensions and retirement benefits in divorce
proceedings.
V. CONCLUSION
Women are not alone in facing a retirement crisis, and many
of the challenges they face are not unique to women. Yet because
two out of three poor older Americans are women, and because
women face some particular, and greater, challenges in retirement
than men, it is appropriate to consider a range of policy proposals
that specifically address the sources and increased scope of those

214. See, e.g., Comprehensive Women’s Pension Protection Act of 1997, S.
320, 105th Cong. § 103(a)(1) (1998) (providing that domestic relations order
shall be deemed to allocate 50 percent of marital share of pension benefits to
spouse upon dissolution of marriages lasting at least five years); Women’s
Pension Protection Act of 1999, S. 132, 106th Cong. § 103(a)(1) (1999)
(providing that domestic relations order shall be deemed to allocate 50 percent
of marital share of pension benefits to spouse upon dissolution of marriages
lasting at least five years); Retirement Enhancement Act of 2004, H.R. 5397,
108th Cong. § 204(a) (2004) (providing that domestic relations order that does
not specifically address pension benefits shall be treated as a Qualified
Domestic Relations Order providing that former spouse receive at least 50
percent of the marital share of pension benefits upon dissolution of marriages
lasting at least five years).
215. See Pension Benefits—Attachment to Judgment (FL-348), JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF CAL., http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/fl348.pdf (last visited
Feb. 14, 2013) (charging the parties with delivering a copy of the order to the
plan administrator of the retirement plan provided by employers for whom
they work or worked in which they participated during the marriage and
before separation).
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